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Abstract 
 This thesis explores some of the connections between the defence industry and the 
European border policy that emerged leading up to, and following, the European refugee 
crisis of 2015. The paper is divided into two parts. The first seeks to examine and 
understand the context in which the refugee crisis occurred. In order to do this, I begin 
with a literature review that uses the integration theory of Multilevel Governance to 
understand how and where the various institutions and structures of the European Union 
(EU) are susceptible to political pressure or special interest influence. Next, I present a 
brief history of the causes and course of the crisis coupled with the pre-existing border 
regime in which the crisis occurred. In doing so, I identify four key trends in European 
policy, namely trends towards the centralisation, externalisation, privatisation, and 
militarisation of border control. I conclude the first section with a discussion of the 
defence industry in Europe, how they profit off of border control measures, and the ways 
in which they lobby. The second section attempts to synthesis the background and 
context provided in the first section in order to determine whether actors in the defence 
industry were lucky beneficiaries of policies movements that happened to benefit them, 
or, if they were proactive lobbyists seeking to shape those policies in such a way that 
maximised their profits. I do this through discussing each trend, lobbyist influence, and 
the implications each trend has for refugees. Finally, I conclude that although there is 
significant evidence of lobbyist influence in shaping the policies, the presence of a 
myriad of other factors makes it nearly impossible to quantify how big a role lobbyist 
influence was in determining outcomes. Nevertheless, the ability for a special interest to 
take advantage of the porosity of the EU and effect self-serving and profit maximising 
international policy outcomes at the expense of the most vulnerable in society should be 
both cause for concern and further inquiry.  
 
Acknowledgments  
 I would like to begin by thanking Professor Taw – you have challenged me since 
freshman year in Gov 70H, and I know my college career (and my writing!) would not be 
where it is without you constantly pushing me to do better. I especially would not have 
been able to write this thesis without your support, guidance, and responses to my long 
emails. Thank you, thank you! 
 I would also like to thank my wonderful friends who kept me sane while writing 
this, and pulled me away from it and outside when I needed it. 
 Mama and baba, thank you for your endless love and support. I would not be 
where I am, and I would not be able to have done what I have without such strong parents 
and such a wonderful family beside me. I will forever be grateful. 
 Finally, I want to dedicate this thesis to India Nunan, the Hope School, Souriyat 
Across Borders, and everyone else in Amman and Athens who taught me that if I 
listened, I could hear our shared humanity.   
Table of Contents  
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................7 
Integration Theory ...........................................................................................................8 
Multilevel Governance .................................................................................................9 
The EU Adopts Multilevel Governance .....................................................................14 
European Union Structure ..............................................................................................18 
Institutions of The EU ................................................................................................19 
Multilevel Governance and Vulnerabilities in the EU ...................................................27 
The Lobbyists .............................................................................................................28 
Lobbying Tactics ........................................................................................................33 
 
EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS .....................................................................................40 
Migrants or Refugees? ...................................................................................................40 
Explaining Trends ..........................................................................................................42 
The Crisis .......................................................................................................................45 
Central Mediterranean Route ....................................................................................46 
Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan Route ..................................................48 
 
EUROPEAN BORDERS: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS .............................................54 
The European Border Regime .......................................................................................55 
Legal Context: Treaties..............................................................................................55 
Border Management Policies ....................................................................................63 
EU-Wide Responses ......................................................................................................74 
European Council Conclusions .................................................................................75 
 
DEFENDING EUROPE: THE INDUSTRY, LOBBY, & CRISIS..............................81 
The European Defence Industry ....................................................................................81 
Relevant Policies ........................................................................................................86 
Key Players in the Defence Lobby ................................................................................90 
Industrial Associations...............................................................................................91 
Delegations of Sector Companies ..............................................................................96 
Expert Groups ............................................................................................................96 
Think Tanks ................................................................................................................97 
The Industry and the Crisis ..........................................................................................100 
 
TRENDING TO PROFIT .............................................................................................103 
Centralisation ...............................................................................................................108 
European Border and Coast Guard .........................................................................111 
Implications..............................................................................................................115 
Militarisation ................................................................................................................117 
Militarisation of Borders .........................................................................................117 
Militarisation of Responses to Refugees ..................................................................119 
Implications..............................................................................................................124 
Privatisation .................................................................................................................128 
Privately Run Detention Centres .............................................................................129 
Security Research Programmes ...............................................................................134 
Implications..............................................................................................................140 
Externalisation .............................................................................................................143 
Responsive Actions...................................................................................................144 
Preventive Actions ...................................................................................................147 
Implications..............................................................................................................149 
So What? ......................................................................................................................152 
 
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................154 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................157   
 1 
 
1 
Introduction 
Lamia had just began his Masters in Archaeology at the University of 
Aleppo when the war broke out. For a while, he tried to continue living his 
normal life. He had a position as assistant to the head of the National Museum of 
Aleppo, and is fluent in 7 ancient languages, as well as English, French, and 
Arabic. He taught an undergraduate class on ancient Aramaic, and in addition, 
helped his father run their small business.  
Lamia had managed to escape the draft for his education, but with the 
army trying to charge him for evading his conscription on the one hand, and the 
Free Syrian Army pressuring him to join their cause on the other, he decided it 
was time to flee. He made his way from Aleppo to Turkey. Like many Syrian 
refugees, he found himself alone in Istanbul. For a year and a half Lamia worked 
odd jobs - as a tailor, at a kebab shop, and as a tutor - before deciding his stagnant 
life in Turkey was not worth it. Lamia and some friends he had made in Istanbul 
made their way to Izmir to try their luck with a smuggler.  
Lamia took his €1500 and one backpack of things and entrusted it all to 
the smuggler. The way he describes his experience is haunting:1 
                                                 
1 Lamia had told me his story during a conversation we had, and I had heard him repeat it to 
others. I wrote his story in the first person from my memory, and it was sent to him before 
publishing for approval and editing. This story was originally published in my INT198 paper for 
Summer 2016 following my time working in the Skaramagas Refugee Camp in Athens, Greece at 
the Hope School. 
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We were supposed to leave at midnight. The whole day before, I 
could not eat or drink or sleep. My friends and I all knew we were 
all scared and nervous, but we never mentioned it. Instead, we 
joked about how when we landed in Europe we would all be rich, 
and greeted with a house and a car. At midnight, we arrived at the 
meeting point. There were maybe 80 or 90 other people. Many 
were children. After an hour of waiting, we began to get nervous. 
Maybe they had stolen our money and run, or had turned us in to 
the authorities. Around 2 am, we saw a small orange boat approach 
the shore. I kept waiting for another one to show up, because I 
thought to myself there is no way we will all fit. But the smuggler 
began yelling in Turkish and putting us all on the boat. We were so 
tightly packed I could barely breathe, but I remember being 
grateful for it because the air was cold. We left the shore, and all 
around me I heard people muttering the dua’a (supplication) for 
travel.  
 
We had been on the water for about 30 minutes, when we saw 
another boat pull up alongside us. Our smuggler turned to me and 
my friend and told us to navigate the boat. He pointed in the 
direction we were meant to go, got onto the other boat, and left us. 
The children began to cry. My friend and I did the best we could, 
following the stars and trying to get us to safety. We kept ourselves 
occupied with songs and verses from the Quran. I believe it helped 
us, to not have to think the thoughts that we might drown or die, or 
be sent back to Turkey, and to instead think only about the verses 
we were saying together. I know I will remember those words for 
the rest of my life. 
 
I do not know how many hours we were on the sea together. But it 
was long enough that we began to see some light in the sky as we 
landed on the island, greeted by foreigners speaking a language 
none of us knew.  
 
Lamia’s story is one that is not unique to him. Most refugees in Greece 
have a similar tale, whether they arrived by land or sea, and whether their journey 
was smoother or more perilous. For them, “Fortress Europe” is not an abstract 
metaphor employed in policy circles and in the reports of human rights agencies. 
“Fortress Europe” is very real, and takes the form of Frontex boats at sea, fences 
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at borders, barking patrol dogs, and convoluted asylum procedures -- it is the 
barrier to their dreamt-of life. 
When Europe’s refugee crisis was at its peak in 2015, over one million 
migrants and refugees had crossed into Europe, and 3,771 lost their lives in the 
attempt. The EU and its Member States mobilised, enacting a variety of policy 
measures intended to stem the flow of people. The next year, in 2016, the 
numbers of arrivals dropped to 387,487. Curiously, the death toll did not follow a 
similar downward trend. The International Organisation for Migration marked 
2016 as the deadliest year for the Mediterranean, with an estimated 5,079 deaths. 
This apparent paradox presents an interesting puzzle, and an investigation into the 
causes of this paradox was what led me to the crux of this thesis. 
Much of the increase in the death rate in the Mediterranean can be 
attributed to the way in which Europe decided to respond to the crisis. Rather than 
create easily accessible legal avenues through which people could apply for 
asylum and thus manage flows, Europe chose to respond by attempting to seal off 
access to the continent.  
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part seeks to “set the stage” 
so to speak, in order to understand the context in which the refugee crisis 
occurred, and how this context enabled the defence industry to exploit flaws in the 
structure of the EU, ultimately enabling domestic special interests to shape 
international policy.  
The paper begins with a literature review concerned with the ways in 
which scholars have attempted to apply theory to the integration of Europe. I pay 
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special attention to the theory of Multilevel Governance (MLG), which Gary 
Marks defines as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments 
at several territorial tiers in which supranational, national, regional and local 
governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks.”2 MLG is 
particularly useful for the purposes of this thesis due to its institutional 
recognition within the EU. Having established the lens of MLG, I review the 
structure of the EU and its legislative processes. Finally, I conclude with an 
examination of where the institutional susceptibilities to political pressure or 
special interest influence lie, coupled with a discussion on the form lobbying 
takes. 
Having understood the institutional and governmental context, the next 
chapter seeks to understand the causes and course of the refugee crisis through 
understanding the semantics associated with “migrant” and “refugee,” the push 
and pull factors that explain some of the quantifiable trends, and a presentation of 
numbers and statistics outlining the course the crisis took. 
In order to further understand the crisis, I will present a discussion of the 
border regime in which the crisis occurred. This chapter will examine the 
historical and legal backing of European borders, particularly the unique 
Schengen norms that govern the continent, and historic approaches to border 
management. Next, the chapter examines Europe’s reaction to the crisis once it 
                                                 
2 Marks, Gary, et al. "European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric vs Multi-level 
Governance." (402-403) 
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had hit its peak, through a review of EU-wide attitudes as embodied in European 
Council conclusions.  
Section one concludes with a discussion of Europe’s defence industry -- 
namely who they are, their significance to the EU economy, and relevant 
governmental policies. Next, I study key players in the defence lobby as they exist 
in four forms: industrial associations, delegations of sector companies, expert 
groups, and think tanks. Finally, I examine the ways in which the European 
defence industry is both a facilitator and beneficiary of the very conflicts that 
fuelled the refugee crisis. 
The second section takes the context provided by the history of the refugee 
crisis, information on the European border regime, and the European defence 
industry and lobby to examine how the defence industry benefits from, and has 
attempted to shape, trends in Europe’s border policy, and what the implications of 
this are for refugees. I identify four trends in European border policy -- 
centralisation, militarisation, privatisation, and externalisation. Each subsequent 
section that unpacks the trends follows a similar formula. I begin by defining the 
trend and briefly placing it in a greater historical context. Next, I examine EU or 
domestic policies that embody that trend (with special attention paid to the EAM). 
I then point out the ways in which the defence industry profits either directly or 
indirectly off of these trends, and I identify any connections that can be drawn 
between the defence industry/their lobbyists and the EU. Each section concludes 
with what the implications of these policies are for refugees.  
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Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of how the issues I have 
identified, namely special interest influence in shaping regional policy, may affect 
refugees, Europeans, and the EU as an institution. 
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2 
Literature Review 
In many ways, the EU itself is an unprecedented political experiment that 
challenges many of the most basic and traditional conceptualizations of 
sovereignty, borders, and governance. This chapter seeks to review the existing 
literature regarding European integration theory in an attempt to inform our 
understanding of the modern EU organisation, and what the implications of its 
organisation are for its susceptibility to political pressure. The chapter is broken 
into three parts that can be discussed nicely through a metaphor of the EU as a 
castle. The first part will provide the historical and theoretical backing that 
explains why the castle was built the way it was. Particular attention will be paid 
to the tension that exists between members’ perceived benefits of integration as it 
contrasts to their relative interests in sovereignty. The second part will illustrate 
what the castle looks like. For the purposes of this paper, only the branches 
responsible for law making or agenda setting will be discussed. Finally, this 
chapter will attempt to point out the flaws in the castle defence, and in doing so 
connect the implications of its organisation to its susceptibility to political 
pressures. 
This chapter will provide some of the theoretical backing and context for 
the rest of this paper, which will look more specifically at how the defence 
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industry may or may not have sought to exploit some of the flaws in the castle 
defence through lobbying to effect changes, or direct, European border control.  
Integration Theory 
Since the time of the 1950s, in the early pre-EU days, scholars have been 
fascinated by what European integration means for the field of international 
relations theory. Integration theory first emerged as a way to describe and explain 
the phenomenon of integration. Its main themes attempted to address the 
circumstances in which integration took place, and how the outcomes of the 
integration came to be. 
In the 1980s and onwards, as European states grew closer together, 
integration entrenched itself deeper into the structure and functioning of European 
states. The more this happened, the more Europe began to challenge realist 
assumptions of territory and state. The descriptive powers of previous theory were 
no longer sufficient, and scholars instead turned to the power and structure of 
institutions as a means by which to contribute to an understanding of European 
integration. European integration theory attempted to answer questions regarding 
the political system in place, legislative and regulatory processes, and how the 
nascent political machine works.3   
Finally, in the 1990s with the emergence of the modern EU, it became 
necessary for theory to morph once more to the needs of reality. The EU was 
                                                 
3  Wiener, Antje, and Thomas Diez. European integration theory. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. Pp 6 - 9.  Table 1.1 
 9 
 
beginning to define itself as a distinct political entity, and so theory needed to 
both construct and limit the EU’s identity and bounds. Theorists began to try and 
answer how and with social and political consequences does integration develop, 
and how integration and governance are (and should be) conceptualised in a way 
that was not state-centric.4 
Multilevel Governance 
One of the most significant theories to emerge during the 1990s was that 
of Multilevel Governance (MLG), developed by political scientists Liesbet 
Hooghe and Gary Marks. The theory of MLG was sparked by study following the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which created the Euro, established the 
tri-pillar structure of the EU,5 and established the European Committee of the 
Regions (CoR), an assembly of local and regional representatives that provides 
sub-national authorities with a direct voice within the EU.6  
The increased integration brought about by the Maastricht Treaty 
correlated with and even pre-empted global trends in governance. A survey 
performed in 2001, less than a decade after the Maastricht Treaty, found that 63 of 
75 developing countries had been undergoing some decentralization of authority.7 
                                                 
4 Wiener and Diez, European Integraton Theory. p 6-9 Table 1.1 
5 These three pillars included one supranational pillar created from three European Communities 
(formerly included the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the 
European Atomic Energy Community), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, 
and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar.  
6 European Union. “Information and Notices.” Official Journal of the European Communities. 
Volume 35. 29 July 1992. ISSN 0378-6986.  
7 Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. Multi-level governance and European integration. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001. 
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Within Europe, Hooghe and Marks found that no EU country had become more 
centralised between 1980 and 2000, while half had decentralised authority to a 
regional tier of government.8  
Hooghe and Marks noticed an increasing trend in the dispersion of 
decision making from primarily state-centric and a matter of sovereignty to both 
the supranational, national, and subnational levels (including regional and local).9 
With this observation as their starting point, Hooghe and Marks developed a 
theory of MLG that is both “a label for a specific manifestation of public 
administration and state-society interaction and an academic approach to 
understanding present-day politics and government.”10  
Marks defines MLG as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers in which supranational, national, regional 
and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy 
networks.”11 12 MLG can be categorised by four key dimensions, who combine to 
create a theoretical framework that allows one to delve deeper into the complex 
network of interests, actors, and authorities that interact at various levels. These 
                                                 
8 Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. Multi-level governance and European integration.  
9 Marks, Gary, et al. "European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric vs Multi-level 
Governance." Debates on European Integration, 2006, 357-77. doi:10.1007/978-0-230-20933-
6_15. (341) 
10 Berg van den, Caspar. “Transforming for Europe: The Reshaping of National Bureaucracies in 
a System of Multi-Level Governance.” LUP Dissertations. Leiden University Press, Amsterdam 
NL. 2010. ProQuest ebrary. Web. (10) 
11 Marks, Gary, et al. "European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric vs Multi-level 
Governance." (402-403) 
12 Marks, Gary. “Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC” in: A. Cafruny and G. 
Rosenthal (ed.) The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond 
(Boulder 1993) pp.391–411 
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facets of the feature place it in a unique position to complement and bolster 
existing frameworks and levels of analysis.13 
As mentioned earlier, the first dimension concerns the increased 
participation, power, and influence of semi-state and non-state actors in 
governance. This increase marks a shift away from traditional, state-centric 
notions of decision making and authority by recognizing and legitimating pre-
existing actions by semi-state and non-state actors to influence governance.14  
The second dimension logically follows from the first. The increased 
participation, power, and influence of semi-state and non-state actors in 
governance naturally creates systems of power sharing amongst various actors 
and levels of governance (such as subnational and supranational).15 The presence 
of system in which power is shared enables a deeper understanding of the 
transformation of the state’s role in setting strategies of coordination, 
steering, and networking.16 This is particularly important, because the 
combination of increased influence and power sharing results in a situation in 
which the state loses both power and authority, a significant shift away from 
traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty.  
The re-evaluation of the state’s role in setting strategies of coordination 
requires in turn a re-evaluation of a traditional understanding of decision making. 
                                                 
13 Stubbs, Paul. "Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and The 
Politics of Scale In South East Europe". Southeast European Politics VI.2 (2005): 66 - 87. Print. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16  Bache, Ian, and Matthew V. Flinders. Multi-level governance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016. (197) 
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Bache and Flinders argue that integration necessitates a move away from 
understanding decision making in terms of “discrete territorial levels” and instead 
to conceptualise it in terms of “complex overlapping networks.”17 These 
networks have a “horizontal” dimension (referring to cooperation arrangements 
between regions or municipalities) as well as a “vertical dimension” (referring to 
linkages between higher and lower levels of government). 
Finally, the three previous factors combine to create a system in which 
democratic accountability is threatened. The increased influence of semi/non-
state actors and their subsequent effects on power sharing and decision making 
within a system shift authority, power, and in some cases legitimacy away from 
the state. In such a system, the final output is driven by a complex overlapping 
process of negotiation, bargaining, and pressure that is shaped by individual 
properties (demands, interests, resources, and competencies) of actors who may 
not democratically accountable.18 Nevertheless, the limited democratic anchorage 
of MLG is often considered to be a necessary shift for policy effectiveness as well 
as promising in terms of broadening participation.  
Despite MLG’s value in “forcing one to address processes of the 
supranationalisation, the decentralisation and the dispersal of authority as 
potentially coterminous, rather than engaging in very narrow, linear, debates 
about the influence, or lack of influence, of international agencies,"19 it is has 
                                                 
17 Bache, Ian, and Matthew V. Flinders. Multi-level governance. (197) 
18 Stubbs, Paul. "Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and The 
Politics of Scale In South East Europe" 
19 Ibid. (67) 
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faced its fair share of criticism. Both Stubbs and Conzelmann have accused MLG 
of “premature normativism,”20 “abstract modelling,” and “rehashed neo-
pluralism.”21 
Though both scholars bring up valid critiques, they are not entirely 
applicable here. At the time of writing for Stubbs and Conzelmann, it was true 
that scholars prematurely “accepted uncritically the presumption that governance 
has become (and should be) multi-jurisdictional.”22 Yet time has since shown that 
the institution evolved in such a way that acceptance of such a presumption was 
correct. Multi-jurisdictional governance is indeed a norm today, thus this critique 
will be disregarded. 
Stubbs and Conzelmann further argue that the relationship between 
abstract modelling (particularly Type I and Type II forms under MLG) and their 
respective comparative cases is lacking and subject to “theoretical vagueness.” 
This criticism is indeed valid, however once more is tempered by the time that has 
passed since the time of writing. Furthermore, this paper provides an attempt to 
examine the concrete manifestations of a multi-tiered government structure on 
policy outcomes. 
Although MLG remains a fairly contested concept, Bache and Flinders 
rightly note that its “broad appeal reflects a shared concern with increased 
                                                 
20 Ibid. (68) 
21 Conzelmann, Thomas. "A New Mode of Governing? Multi-level Governance between 
Cooperation and Conflict." Multi-Level Governance in the European Union: Taking Stock and 
Looking Ahead, 2008, 9-31. doi:10.5771/9783845210605-9. 
22 Ibid. 
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complexity, proliferating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors, and the related 
challenges to state power.”23 
The EU Adopts Multilevel Governance 
The MLG approach considers the EU a political system in its own right. 
Thus, European policy is viewed as the result of constant coordination across 
different territorial levels including a supranational, national, regional, and local 
level. The relationship amongst these levels are characterised by interdependence 
and overlap. These interactions, considered the vertical dimension of the 
European policy process, is complemented by the presence of a horizontal 
dimension. Thus, members of the system are coordinating not only across 
territorial dimensions but also within.   
The appeal (both academic and political) of MLG as a theory by which to 
explain and analyse the conditions of European integration is fairly obvious. As 
the theory gained traction, it was increasingly noticed by the institution of the EU 
-- particularly following the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The 
Lisbon Treaty is the most recent treaty to amend the Treaty on European Union, 
and is the basis for the current structure of the EU. 
In June 2009, the European Committee of the Regions adopted its first 
White Paper on multilevel governance.24 This White Paper was followed up with 
the creation of the Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe in April, 2014. 
                                                 
23 Bache, Ian, and Matthew V. Flinders. Multi-level governance. (4 - 5) 
24 European Union. “White Paper on Multilevel Governance.” The Committee of the Regions. 18 
June 2009.  
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The Charter encourages its signatories to “experiment with innovative policy 
solutions in adherence with MLG principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, and 
partnership, and to promote the use of multilevel partnerships and instruments for 
joint policy action.”25 The Charter is open for signature to all EU local and 
regional authorities, European and national associations of local and regional 
authorities, and National and European political figures wishing to declare their 
support. Interestingly, non/semi-state actors are not included in this list.26 
Nevertheless, the Charter represents the heavy tilt in favour of MLG as a strategy 
and form of governance within the EU.  
Since MLG is reflected in official EU documents, one would expect 
conceptions of “Europeanisation” to contain elements characteristic of MLG. 
Bache identifies five of the most common uses of the term “Europeanisation,” 
each of which contains elements characteristic of both the nature and 
implementation of a multi-level governmental system. 
The first and oldest meaning of the term “Europeanisation” is used to refer 
to the “top down impact of the EU on its member states.”27 Héretier defines 
this type of Europeanization as “the process of influence deriving from European 
decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative 
structures.”28 Bulmer and Radaelli take this idea further and state that 
                                                 
25 European Union. “Resolution of the Committee of the Regions on the Charter for Multilevel 
Governance in Europe.” Committee of the Regions. 3 April 2017.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Bache, Ian. "Europeanization and Britain: Towards Multi-Level Governance?" Archive of 
European Integration. Austin, Texas. (2005). 
28 Héritier, A., et al. Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 2001. p 3 
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Europeanisation consists of “processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and 
public policies.”29 
The second meaning equates Europeanisation with the process of 
European integration, defining it as the “accumulation of policy competencies at 
the EU level.”30  
The previous meaning is closely linked with the use of Europeanisation to 
discuss the “growing importance of the EU as a reference point for national 
and sub-national actors.”31 This is fascinating from a lobbying perspective. As 
competencies are shifted and jurisdiction lines are blurred, subnational actors 
(particularly special interest groups) adjust their expectations and beliefs 
regarding the most efficient and effective way to lobby away from the national 
government and towards the EU.32 This idea is crucial to this thesis, and will be 
discussed in greater length in the final section of this chapter. 
The fourth use of Europeanisation draws off the increased communication, 
coordination, and inter-state transfer that is facilitated by the existence of the EU. 
This use defines Europeanisation as the “horizontal transfer of concepts and 
                                                 
29 Bulmer, S. and Radaelli, C. “The Europeanisation of National Policy?” Europeanisation Online 
Papers. Queen’s University Belfast. No. 1/2004. (4)  
30 Bache, Ian. "Europeanization and Britain: Towards Multi-Level Governance?"  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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policies in the EU between member states.”33 In this context, the sharing of 
ideas and practices facilitated through mechanisms of learning and borrowing 
contributes to an ever more similar European-national political identity.34 
Whilst the fourth use describes the horizontal transfer of concepts, the fifth 
use identifies the existence of a vertical dimension as well. This use discusses 
Europeanisation as the “two-way interaction between states and the EU.”35 
Just as countries shape the structure of each other through EU facilitated idea 
sharing, and just as the EU has a top down impact on its member states, so too do 
the member states have a bottom (or middle) up impact on the EU. As Bomberg 
and Peterson empirically observed, states “routinely pre-empt domestic 
adjustment by shaping an emergent EU policy in their own image.”36 Thus, 
Europeanisation is describes as “the process whereby national systems 
(institutions, policies, governments) adapt to EU policies and integration more 
generally, while also themselves shaping the European Union.”37 
Bache arrives at a final definition of Europeanisation to mean “the 
reorientation or reshaping of aspects of politics (and governance) in the domestic 
                                                 
33 Bache, Ian. "Europeanization and Britain: Towards Multi-Level Governance?"  
34 Burch, M. and Gomez, R. “Europeanization and the English Regions.” paper presented to the 
ESRC Seminar Series/UACES Study Group on the Europeanisation of British Politics and Policy-
Making. University of Sheffield. 2 May 2003.    
35 Burch, M. and Gomez, R. (2003), ‘Europeanization and the English Regions’,  
36 Bomberg, E. and Peterson, J. “Policy Transfer and Europeanization.” Europeanisation Online 
Papers. Queen’s University Belfast. No. 2/2000. August 2000. p 4 
37 Laffan, B. and Stubb, A. “Member States” in Bomberg, E. and Stubb, A. (eds.), The European 
Union: How Does it Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 69-87. 
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arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices and preferences of European level 
actors (as advanced through EU initiatives and decisions).”38 
Each definition contains elements of one or more of the four key 
dimensions of MLG, namely the increased power/authority/influence of non-state 
and semi-state actors, the creation of a system of power sharing within and 
amongst tiers of government, a re-evaluated conception of decision making to one 
of complex overlapping networks, and challenges to democratic accountability.  
The next section of this chapter will outline the structure and functioning 
of the EU as a means by which to concretely identify how theories of European 
integration, Europeanisation, and MLG have manifested themselves in the EU.  
European Union Structure 
Regardless of theoretical debates on what the EU is, its implications for 
international relations and governance, or how it can be explained, the process of 
integration has been going on for over a century, ultimately leading to the 
institution we have today. For the purposes of this paper, I will present a brief 
overview of the structure and functioning of the EU, particularly as it relates to 
law-making and agenda setting. 
The EU is based on the rule of law. Every action it takes derives its 
legitimacy from the democratically approved treaties it rests on, beginning with 
the 1958 Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community 
                                                 
38 Burch, M. and Gomez, R. “Europeanization and the English Regions.” 
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(EEC) as well as many of the modern institutions of the EU. Since then, the EU 
has grown and morphed through a succession of further treaties. These treaties 
“lay down the objectives of the EU, the rules for EU institutions, how decisions 
are made, and the relationship between the EU and its Member States.”39 
The current structure of the EU has its legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty, 
which was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty was 
essentially an incorporation and consolidation of the two primary Treaties of the 
European Union. The first treaty is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), which originated as the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community in 1957 and was amended by the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992. The second primary treaty is the Treaty on European Union,40 originally 
implemented by the Treaty of Maastricht as well.  
Institutions of the EU 
The decision-making and legislative processes of the EU are much more 
complex than those of national governments. There are four institutions that are 
responsible for decision-making and/or legislative processes at the EU level, and 
all four institutions interact and balance each other.  
The European Council is the institution of the EU that is comprised of 
the Heads of State or Government from each Member State, the President of the 
European Council (currently Donald Tusk), and the President of the European 
                                                 
39 European Union. “How the European Union Works.” European Commission. June 2013. p 5 
40European Union. "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union." Official Journal of 
the European Union. 26 October 2012.  
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Commission (currently Jean-Claude Juncker). The High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently Federica Mogherini) also 
takes part in the meetings.  
The European Council represents the highest level of political cooperation. 
They do not adopt legislation, however they are responsible for defining the 
political direction and priorities of the EU. Meetings take place four times a year, 
with additional meetings called to address urgent issues. At the end of each 
meeting, the European Council issues ‘conclusions’ that are reached through 
consensus, and in special instances qualified majority voting (although only the 
Heads of State or Government may cast a vote).  
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The conclusions issued by the Council are key indicators of attitudes and 
priorities amongst EU members at any given time. The presence or absence of an 
issue, as well as the recommendations given to the European Commission for 
proposals to address a particular challenge or opportunity, provide a gauge for 
mainstream perspectives and opinions. The conclusions of the European Council 
will play a large role in later chapters discussing attitudes towards border control 
policies. 
The European Parliament is the parliamentary institution of the EU that 
is directly elected by universal suffrage every five years. It is composed of 751 
members of European Parliament (MEPs), and these members combined 
represent the second largest democratic electorate in the world after India.41 
MEPs are grouped by political affiliation rather than nationality. The Parliament 
has three main roles. First is the power of legislation, which is shares with the 
council through the most commonly used ‘co-decision procedure.’ Parliament 
must be consulted on a range of other issues, and its approval must be granted for 
political or institutional decisions and changes. Second, Parliament exercises 
democratic supervision over other EU institutions. It has the power to approve or 
reject the nomination of the President of the commission and Commissioners, and 
the right to censure the Commission as a whole. MEPs can check the Council 
through monitoring their use, and remain in close cooperation with the Council 
even in areas in which the Council alone is responsible for decision making. 
                                                 
41 European Union. “About European Parliament.” European Parliament. Web. Accessed 21 April 
2017.  
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Finally, the Parliament holds the power of the purse, and shares authority with the 
council over EU budget and spending, though it holds the ultimate verdict.  
The Parliament has ceremonial precedence over all other European-level 
authorities, and shares equal legislative and budgetary powers with the council. 
Parliament is presided over by a president, currently Antonio Tajani of Italy, and 
serves a role similar to that of a speaker in a national parliament. Presidential 
elections occur every two and a half years.42  
The European Parliament works to pass laws in conjunction with the 
Council of the European Union (often referred to as the Council of Ministers or 
simply the Council, and not to be confused with the European Council). The 
Council is the second half of the bicameral legislature, and represents the 
executive governments of the EU’s member states. The Council gathers to 
discuss, amend, coordinate, and adopt Member States’ policies. There are ten 
different council configurations,43 in no hierarchical order. Council meetings are 
attended by representatives from each Member State at a ministerial level (and so 
are either ministers or state secretaries). Importantly, ministers have the power to 
commit their governments to the actions agreed in the Council meetings. 
                                                 
42 Ibid 
43 These configurations are 1. Foreign Affairs, 2. General Affairs, 3. Economic and Financial 
Affairs, 4. Justice and Home Affairs, 5. Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, 
6. Education, Youth, Culture and Sport, 7. Competitiveness, 8. Transport, Telecommunications 
and Energy, 9. Agriculture and Fisheries, and 10. Environment. The configuration of Foreign 
Affairs is chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, whereas all others are chaired by the Member State holding the Presidency of the 
Council. 
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Ministers are answerable to elected national authorities, which is intended to 
ensure the democratic legitimacy of their decisions. 
The Council has five key responsibilities: 
“1. To pass European laws. In most fields, it legislates 
jointly with the European Parliament.  
2. To coordinate the Member States’ policies. 
3. To develop the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy, based on guidelines set by the European Council.  
4. To conclude international agreements between the EU 
and one or more states or international organisations.  
5. To adopt the EU’s budget, jointly with the European 
Parliament.”44 
 
A President chairs the Council, and the Presidency of the Council rotates 
between the Member States every six months. The role of the President is to chair 
and organise the different Council meetings in order to maintain transparency and 
consistency between configurations.  
The final institution of the EU responsible for decision-making is the 
European Commission. The Commission is a politically independent branch of 
the EU dedicated to representing and upholding the common interests of the EU 
as a whole. The Commission is comprised of 28 Commissioners (one from each 
Member State) and is led by President Jean-Claude Juncker. The Commission is 
composed of the President, the first Vice-President, the Vice-President and High 
Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Policy, five Vice-Presidents, and 
twenty Commissioners.  
The Commission President is nominated by the European Council and 
confirmed by Parliament. The President then selects his or her Commissioners 
                                                 
44 European Union. “How the European Union Works.” 
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based on suggestions from EU countries who are approved by the European 
Council.  
The Commission holds the “right of initiative,” meaning it is the 
Commission’s job to draw up proposals for new legislation. Proposals are meant 
to defend EU-wide interests, not simply the interests of one Member. These 
proposals are then presented to Parliament and the Council who use the 
codecision process to adopt or reject legislation. The Commission will only 
propose action at EU level if it is believed that the issue cannot be adequately 
addressed at a national level. If the Commission does decide EU wide action is 
needed, it will consult committees of experts and various special interest groups 
(referred to as Directorate Generals) to draft legislation.  
Further responsibilities of the Commission include management and 
implementation of EU policies and budgets, the enforcement of EU law (jointly 
through the Court of Justice), and to act as the representative of the Union around 
the world.  
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Legislative Processes 
There are several different types of legal acts enacted by the EU. The three 
binding legal acts are regulations, directives, and decisions. Regulations are 
applicable and binding in all Member States and do not need to be passed into 
national law by Members. In some cases, national law may need to be altered in 
order to avoid conflicting with the regulation. A directive binds Members to 
achieve a particular objective. The directive signifies the result to be achieved, 
although the means through which it is achieved is up to each Member State and 
enacted through national laws. Decisions can be addressed to Member States, 
groups of states or people, or individual. An example of a decision would be a 
ruling on proposed mergers between companies. Recommendations and 
opinions are legal acts that have no binding force. 
The majority of legislation is adopted using the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure. During this process, the European Commission proposes legislation 
to the European Parliament and the Council for review. In the event that the 
legislation is not adopted after the first reading, there will be a second reading and 
if necessary a conciliation after which point the act is either adopted or rejected. 
Depending on the subject of the proposal, there may be additional procedures.  
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Multilevel Governance and Vulnerabilities in the EU  
The European Union evolved into its current form without one clear 
master plan or deliberate design. In part because of the incremental evolution of 
the EU, there exist several institutional susceptibilities to political pressure or 
special interest influence. The introduction of the co-decision procedure gave the 
European Parliament a greater role in decision making, including the ability to 
reject legislation the Council favours and approves. The extension of qualified 
majority voting removed veto power from Member States in some economic 
areas. Furthermore, the new competencies granted to the EU (as well as the 
introduction of a single currency) created a need for complex and highly 
specialised knowledge to craft policy. These factors have combined to both 
institutionally underpin the importance and participation of non-state actors or 
civil society in the policy making process, as well as open that same process to 
greater opportunities to influence EU legislation in a multitude of policy areas.45  
Lobbying and special interest advocacy is often considered a crucial factor 
to the functioning of a health democracy. It is one way to make sure the voices, 
concerns, and agendas of all factions of society are heard. When considering the 
incredible diversity present in the union of 28 European states, the ability for 
lobbyists to make the voices of their constituents heard is crucial. However, by 
                                                 
45 Lehmann, Wilhelm. "Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices." European 
Parliament and European Commission Directorate-General for Research. Constitutional Affairs. 
Print. (iv) 
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that same token, it becomes equally important to safeguard the vulnerabilities of 
the EU from exploitation.  
The Lobbyists 
Brussels is the second lobbying capital of the world after Washington DC. 
In 1993, a Commission survey estimated there to be around 3,000 interest groups 
and 10,000 lobbyists in Brussels. By 2016, Transparency International estimated 
that that number had risen to 37,350 -- 26,480 of which held at least one lobby 
pass for the Parliament or had access to high level meetings -- making the ratio of  
lobbyists to bureaucrats nearly one to one.46 Transparency International also sets 
the spending of the lobbying industry at US$1.6 billion,47 of which US$145 
million is spent by the top ten companies alone.48 So, who is lobbying and whose 
interests are being represented? 
First, it is important to note that there is no consensus on what is defined 
as lobbying nor who is a lobbyist, thus, the accuracy is contested. Data presented 
here comes from the EU Transparency Register, a voluntary register of lobbyists 
in the EU founded by the European Transparency Initiative in 2005. Registration 
is not mandatory, however it is a precondition to accreditation and physical access 
to the buildings of the European Parliament.49  
                                                 
46 Freund, Daniel. “How Many Lobbyists are there in Brussels?” Transparency International. 21 
September 2016. Accessed 12 February 2017.  
47 Ibid. 
48 “Number of Organisations and European Parliament Accreditations on the EU Transparency 
Register.” Lobby Facts. Graph Generated 17/03/2017. Accessed 21 April 2017.  
49 European Union. “Transparency and the EU.” Transparency Register. Last Updated 
22/03/2017. Accessed 21 April 2017.  
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Special interest groups can be broadly divided into two categories: civic 
interests (including environmental, regional, social and community, as well as 
consumer concerns) and producer interests (including businesses, professions, and 
labour). Civic interest lobbying typically happens via non-governmental 
organisations’ platforms and networks, think tanks, research institutions, 
academic institutions, organisations representing churches and religious 
communities, organisations representing local, regional, and municipal 
authorities, other public or mixed entities, and other sub-national public 
authorities.50  
Where civic interests tend to use more community based lobbying 
techniques, producer interest lobbying takes two very different forms. First, 
through professional consultancies, law firms, or self-employed consultants such 
as Fleishman-Hillard or Hill & Knowlton.51 The second category consists of in-
house lobbyists and trade or professional associations (like trade unions). 
Lobbyists in this category often represent the interests of big-name companies 
such as Google, Shell, or ExxonMobil, since these are the corporations who have 
the highest stakes and can afford the high costs of lobbying. Associations present 
an opportunity for smaller companies to present sector specific and united goals, 
like through the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations or the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and 
                                                 
50European Union. “Transparency and the EU.” 
51 “Sagardoy Abogados Registration on EU Transparency Register.” Lobby Facts.Accessed 21 
April 2017.  
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Industry. Again, these lobbyists tend to represent the interests of the wealthy.52 
Lobbyists working for this typology account for over 50% of registrants, and 75% 
of lobby meetings declared by the Commission between December 2014 and June 
2015.53  
Interest Tactics 
 
Civic Interests 
Environmental, social, 
regional, community, 
consumer interests 
- NGO platforms and networks 
- Think tanks 
- Academic institutions 
- Organisations representing churches and religious 
communities 
- Organisations representing local, regional, and 
municipal authorities  
- Other public or mixed entities 
- Other sub-national public authorities 
Producer Interests 
Businesses, 
professions, labour 
- Professional consultancies, law firms, or self-
employed consultants 
- Corporate in-house lobbyists 
- Industry or professional associations  
 
As competencies began to shift to the European level in the early 1990s, 
corporations began to recognize and seek out new opportunities for legislation 
shaping, thus leading to an unprecedented boom in economic lobbying. EU 
institutions were faced with the challenge of balancing “its informational needs 
and consultation requirements against a manageable number of interests.”54 
Corporations began to realise this as well, and instead of fighting over the limited 
number of seats at the policy table they chose to create trade federations and 
                                                 
52European Union. “Transparency and the EU.” 
53 European Union. “Transparency of Lobbying at EU Level.” European Parliament. December 
2015. Accessed 21 April 2017.  
54 Lehmann, Wilhelm. "Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices." (12) 
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industrial groupings and create credible “policy profiles.” Over time, these groups 
were invited to participate in various forums, decision making processes in an 
advisory capacity, and consultancy roles. According to Coen, this development 
led to “an inner core of policy-makers and the institutionalisation of big 
businesses in the EU policy process,”55 as well as questions of access, exclusion, 
and leadership within industrial or trade groupings.  
According to Gueguen, belonging to an EU trade association can be 
crucial for companies for two main reasons: “Firstly, the EU trade association 
remains the official representative body with regard to the EU institutions, with 
the consequent advantage in terms of obtaining information and invitations to 
meetings. Secondly, the EU trade association is a crucial meeting place for 
national members.”56 Furthermore, by encouraging EU legislation, public and 
private lobby groups can overcome irritating domestic situations and thus benefit 
their industry EU-wide. By blocking it, they can prevent domestic situations from 
hampering their interests. The incentives of corporations have somewhat changed 
from social interaction and information gathering to economic gain and political 
lobbying.57 
Lobbying activities, regardless of their category, can be grouped to 
achieve four key functions. First, service functions, such as the provision of 
specific or exclusive services for their members (such as information gathering). 
                                                 
55 Lehmann, Wilhelm. "Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices." (12) 
56Gueguen, D. Quoted in Lehmann, Wilhelm. "Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules 
and Practices." (12) 
57  Lehmann, Wilhelm. "Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices." (14) 
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Second, lobbying functions, which are designed to attempt to influence decision 
making processes from the outside (for example through meetings with officials 
or participation in public hearings). These are the activities that are most 
stereotypically assigned to lobbyists. The first two functions exist mainly to serve 
the organisation’s members or clients specifically. Third, decision-making 
functions, that are achieved through direct participation in the decision-making 
process of expert committees. Finally, through implementation functions in 
which the lobbyist will take over management functions in program 
implementations. In contrast to the first two functions, the final two functions 
actively contribute to policy making and the governance of a specific sector.58 
In order to effectively lobby, lobbyists must be able to “identify clear and 
focused policy goals, develop relationships and credibility in the policy process, 
understand the nature of the policy process and institutional access, and look for 
natural allies and alliances to develop profile and access.”59 The lobbyists process 
can be divided into four practical stages (fact finding, analysis, influencing, and 
follow up) for which atmosphere setting, monitoring, and communication are 
crucial components.60  
                                                 
58 Lehmann, Wilhelm. "Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices." (iii) 
59 Bouwen, Pieter. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access." Journal of 
European Public Policy, 9:3, 365-390. Published online 04 February 2011.  
60 Bouwen, Pieter. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access." 
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Lobbying Tactics 
The EU is a massive machine of interconnected links between its bodies 
and Member States, with decision making powers decentralised throughout the 
institution. In such a landscape, the problem of interest groups is not a shortage of 
potential pressure points to influence, but rather an oversupply. One of the most 
important steps in a lobbyists strategy is to identify the various access points and 
determine which route, institution, or tactic will be the most effective means to an 
end. Broadly speaking, lobbyists tend to focus on the Commission to push the 
direction of legislation, the Parliament to build support, and the Council to set the 
nuts and bolts of legislation.  
Furthermore, different types of special interests have varying degrees of 
influence and access to the institutions. According to Bouwen, national 
associations and individual firms tend to enjoy preferential access to the Council, 
industry associations tend to enjoy preferential access to the Commission, and 
lobbyists from representative organisations (irrespective of level of interest 
aggregation) tend to enjoy preferential access to Parliament.61 Consultants had the 
lowest degree of access across the board. Bouwen attributes this to their limited 
ability to provide relevant information to legislators.62    
In order to be the most effective, lobbying will take different forms and 
target different institutions depending on the nature of the organisation and the 
                                                 
61 Bouwen, Pieter. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access.". 
62 Ibid. 
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agenda. Each institution has its own unique pressure points and vulnerabilities 
through which lobbyists may attempt to influence or shape legislation. 
The Commission is the only institution who has the power to propose 
legislation in the EU. Even though an estimated 80% of all legislation proposed 
by the Commission is changed, targeting the Commission enables a special 
interest to influence the way a problem is framed, the direction the solution should 
take, or the way people think about the issue as opposed to the answer itself.63 
There are two ways this can be done.  
The first is through meetings with Commissioners, Cabinet Members, or 
Directors. During these meetings, stakeholders have the opportunity to present 
concerns, propose legislation, and offer advice or expert opinions. Lobbyists must 
register with the Transparency Registry in order to gain access to the 
Commission, and all meetings are recorded on the register. There are currently 
14,436 meetings with 3,441 organisations recorded on the registry. 69% of those 
meetings were with Cabinet Members, 19% were with Commissioners, and 12% 
were with Directors. Of the 3,441 organisations, 58% are corporate, 21% are 
NGOs, 7% are think tanks, and 9% are consultants.64   
The second way to influence the Commission is through direct 
participation. In drafting a proposal, the Commission is advised by ‘expert 
groups,’ or consultative bodies, usually comprised of private and public sector 
                                                 
63 Jasmontaite, Lina. “The Current Lobbying Regulation in the European Union and its Future 
Development.” Thesis for LLM in International and European Public Law. Tilburg University.  
(22 – 24) 
64 “Commission Meetings.” Transparency International. Web. Accessed 21 April 2017. 
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experts appointed by EU governments, the Commission, or its departments.65 
Expert groups advise the Commission in relation to the preparation and 
implementation of legislative proposals, policy initiatives, and delegated acts. 
They are not designed to foster or engage in general debate with the public or 
stakeholders, but rather to provide a forum for discussion and input from high 
level stakeholders. Their input is not binding. 
There are currently 793 expert groups with 26,987 group members. 
Roughly a third of these members represent organisations,66 are individuals 
representing interest groups,67 or are present in a purely personal capacity 
(meaning they are “individuals, acting independently and expressing their 
personal views”68). The other two thirds are sent by national agencies. Non-
governmental and civil society organisations are severely underrepresented in 
many Directorate-Generals, and corporate interests tend to dominate.69  
For a special interest group with an agenda, influence over or access to the 
DG’s and expert groups is an invaluable tool through which to make their voice 
and opinion heard in the Commission. Furthermore, the skew in both meetings 
with the Commission and participation in expert groups clearly demonstrates the 
                                                 
65European Union. “Register of Commission Expert Groups.” 
66 Organisations can be (amongst other things) companies, associations, non-governmental 
organisations, trade unions, colleges, research institutes, EU institutions and international 
organisations. 
67 According to the Commission’s definition, these are supposed to represent the “common 
interests of an interest group” in any given political sphere. 
68 European Union. “Register of Commission Expert Groups.” European Commission. Web. 
Accessed 21 April 2017.  
69 Kaske, Rudi. “Lobbying in Brussels.” Gerechtigkeit Muss Sein. Article 106, 1st Edition, 
September 2015. 6 September 2015.   
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Commission’s readiness to engage with the private corporate sector, for better or 
for worse. Since the purpose of the Commission is to represent the interests of the 
EU as a whole, it is only natural that the Commission should be the most open to 
the interests and advice of EU-wide industry associations, since their interests are 
interpreted to benefit the EU as a whole rather than any single member state or 
company. 
Like the European Council, European Parliament is also subject to 
similar regulations regarding the use of the transparency register. There are 1118 
registered companies and business trade associations, 666 NGOs and trade 
unions, and 214 lobby consultancies. There are four categories of actors and 
activities who are excluded from the scope of the register:  
• “Activities concerning the provision of legal and other professional advice 
(such as that provided by lawyers) when they relate to the exercise of a 
client’s fundamental rights to a fair trial or the right to defence in 
administrative proceedings. 
• Activities of the social partners as actors in the social dialogue when 
acting within the role assigned to them in the treaties. 
• EU member states’ governments, third country governments, international 
intergovernmental organisations and their diplomatic missions. 
• Churches, as well as local, regional and municipal authorities, except their 
representational offices, legal bodies and networks created to represent 
them towards the EU institutions.”70 
 
It is important to take note of these omissions when discussing the means by 
which one might attempt to lobby the European Parliament. Much of the 
legislation proposed by the Commission is modified and amended in the 
Parliament, and in order for a piece of legislation to pass it must go through the 
                                                 
70 Rasmussen, Maja Kluger. “Lobbing in the European Parliament: A Necessary 
Evil.” Centre for European Policy Studies. May 2011. No 242.  
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codecision procedure and be approved by both the Parliament and the 
Commission. Lobbyists typically target the Parliament if they wish to accomplish 
either one of those things, namely building support or proposing amendments. 
 There are many vulnerabilities through which the Parliament may be 
influenced. First, through direct contact with one or many of the 751 MEPs. 
Given the sheer number of MEPs, a good lobbyist will be able to identify an MEP 
in the right position who may sympathize with their cause and work to build 
support within the Parliament. The MEP will then amplify the agenda/concerns of 
the lobbyists in the Plenary sessions.71 Lobbyists may aim to further specialize by 
targeting relevant standing committees who advise the Plenary. Finally, they may 
address efforts to the college of Quaestors, or those who look after the financial 
and administrative interests of MEPs. These techniques are largely indirect ones. 
  A more direct means of voicing positions is done through participation in 
a hearing. Committees are permitted to organize hearings with experts, and if an 
industry is able to position themselves as a credible expert from which to elicit 
testimony, it is an invaluable platform through which to raise concerns about 
legislation or identify pertinent issues. Similarly, they may participate in 
intergroups, where MEPs host informal exchanges aimed at promoting contact 
between MEPs and civil society. They are not Parliament bodies and may not 
                                                 
71 Plenary sessions are the forums in which all MEPs gather to debate and discuss 
various pieces of legislation and their standpoints vis-à-vis the Commission and 
Council.   
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express Parliament’s opinion, but often do bring information or ideas expressed in 
the intergroup back to the Plenary. 
Finally, lobbying in the Council of the European Union is different from 
the Parliament and Commission. The Council does not need to report its contacts 
with lobbyists to the Transparency Registry, nor is there any law requiring 
lobbyists to register in order to gain access like they must for access to the 
Commission or Parliament. Since the Council deals with many of the specifics of 
legislation, broadly speaking a higher degree of contact with stakeholders 
(particularly in the private sector) can be beneficial. This contact gives the 
legislators end-user or producer perspectives from the ground whose nuances may 
get lost or overlooked in the legislation.  
The majority of lobbying that does occur in the Council happens through 
direct contact with either the national ministers working in the Council, or, more 
commonly, lower level cabinet officials. Unlike the Commission, the Council 
does not need to represent the interests of the EU as a whole. Thus, it often 
prioritises national interests over regional ones, and as a result tends to give 
preferential access to national associations.  
 Parliament Council Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
Transparency 
- Companies and 
business trade 
associations: 1118 
organisations, 2042 
pass holders 
- NGOs and trade 
unions: 666 
organisations, 1906 
pass holders 
N/A - 14,436 meetings, 
with: 
    - Cabinet members: 
69% 
    - Commissioners: 
19% 
    - Directors: 12%  
- 3,441 organisations 
    - Corporate: 58% 
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Register72 - Lobby 
consultancies: 214 
organisations, 924 
pass holders 
    - NGO: 21% 
    - Think tanks: 6.5% 
    - Consultants: 8.5% 
- 20,254 registered 
lobbyists 
Reason for 
lobbying 
- Build support for 
legislation 
- Propose 
amendments 
- Guide or set the 
nuts and bolts of 
legislation 
- Push direction or set 
trends 
 
 
 
Vulnerabilities 
- Plenary sessions 
- Standing committees 
- Committee 
secretariats 
- Hearings 
- College of quaestors 
- Intergroups 
- Ministers and 
cabinet officials 
- Lower level 
officials 
- DG groups 
- Expert groups 
- Advisory committees 
 
Highest degree 
of access 
Representative 
organisations 
(irrespective of level 
of interest 
aggregation) 
National 
associations 
EU-wide industry 
associations 
 
A lobbying strategy that will be the most powerful is one that is 
multipronged. It is one that will attempt to push the direction, build support, and 
finesse the nuts and bolts of legislation through both direct contact and 
information provision. Against the backdrop of the state of lobbying, the EU 
structure, and the theory of multilevel governance, the next chapter will present 
the causes, course, and after effects of Europe’s refugee crisis in order to then 
examine the responses, ultimately allowing us to determine whether the defence 
industry employed some of the aforementioned tactics in shaping that response.   
                                                 
72 Numbers come from https://lobbyfacts.eu/articles/30-01-2017/crowding-corridors-power-
corporate-lobbyists-outnumber-ngos-and-unions-european . Data correct as of 25 January 2016. 
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3 
Europe’s Refugee Crisis 
 
Following an understanding of the governmental and institutional 
framework in which the refugee crisis occurred, this chapter seeks to delve deeper 
into the causes and course of the crisis. First, I will present a discussion of the 
semantics of the crisis and the important differences in using the terms “migrant” 
and “refugee.” Next, I will contextualise the refugee crisis in terms of the social, 
political, and economic push and pull factors that explain the trends from 2009 to 
2016. Finally, I will outline and track the land and sea arrivals to Europe (with 
special attention paid to the Central Mediterranean Route and the Eastern 
Mediterranean/Western Balkan route) through statistics that will prove essential 
in understanding the national and regional responses to the crisis that will be 
discussed in the next chapter.     
Migrants or Refugees? 
According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the arm 
of the UN responsible for refugees, there are 65.3 million forcibly displaced 
people worldwide. 21.3 million refugees -- 16.1 million are under the mandate of 
the UNHCR, and 5.2 million Palestinians are under the mandate of the United 
Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). 40.8 million are internally displaced 
persons, and 3.2 million are asylum seekers. Currently, the top ten refugee 
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producing countries are Syria (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), Somalia 
(1.1 million), Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, 
Central African Republic, Iraq, and Eritrea. A whopping 54% of refugees came 
from the top three countries. Despite what media and politicians may make it 
seem in Europe, developing countries host 86% of the world’s refugees. With a 
population of 2.5 million, Turkey holds the most refugees.73 
In 2015, more than one million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe. 
The massive influx of people included those seeking asylum from war and 
persecution as well as those seeking better economic opportunities abroad. 
Though the distinction between “migrant” and “refugee” may seem only 
semantic, it is actually a political distinction with heavy implications.  
A refugee, as defined under the 1951 Refugee Convention, is someone 
who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."74 International law 
grants refugees basic rights, including the right of non-refoulement. Non-
refoulement prohibits host countries from immediately deporting asylum seekers 
back to their war-torn countries of origin. Furthermore, refugees are entitled to 
                                                 
73  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency." 
UNHCR News. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.  
74 UN General Assembly. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 July 1951. United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 189. p. 137 
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benefits and protective services (such as food, housing, clothing, and access to 
health care).  
A migrant, on the other hand, is someone who has chosen to resettle in 
another country in search of economic opportunities such as employment, 
educational opportunities, or a higher standard of living. Although they may be 
escaping harsh conditions of their own, perhaps, even, systems of poverty and 
economic oppression inflicted upon them by their own government, they do not 
fit the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Those denied asylum, and thus 
classified as migrants, are not party to the same set of rights and privileges 
conferred upon refugees, nor are they entitled to the right of non-refoulement, and 
are constantly at the risk of deportation. For many European governments, they 
fall under the umbrella of the Department of Immigration. 
Many news outlets and academics (such as BBC and CNN) prefer to use 
the term “migrant” when discussing the current crisis in Europe. Their reasoning 
is that “migrant” is a term that envelopes both economic migrants and refugees, as 
both populations are “on the move.” Though they are right, the distinction blurs 
the varied access to rights and services that each group has. Furthermore, it paints 
the majority of people in the national dialogue as economic migrants, and 
diminishes the scale of violence and horror from which many refugees are fleeing. 
Explaining Trends 
The refugee crisis arose from a variety of push and pull factors that 
mobilised large populations. These factors can help explain the spike in arrivals 
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and the shift to the Eastern Mediterranean as the preferred migration route, and 
are essential to understanding the national and regional responses to the crisis.  
As for push factors, they lie in instability in the Middle East. The Arab 
Spring and the domino effect it created resulted in the mass displacement of many 
fleeing war or persecution. This was clearly demonstrated in the spike in 
migration on the Central Mediterranean route following the 2011 events in Libya. 
However, in the Eastern Mediterranean route, war and instability triggered a 
series of secondary factors that ultimately lead to the 2015 spikes in migration. 
Violence in Syria erupted in 2011, and the first wave of 5,000 refugees 
arrived in Lebanon, fleeing violence and harsh fighting in the town of 
Kalkalakh.75 From then on, the numbers only increased as Syrians fled to 
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Jordan. In March, 2013, the UNHCR 
declared its one millionth registered refugee. Just six months later that number 
had doubled to two million. Still, the majority of these people remained displaced 
in the Middle East.  
Lebanon and Turkey (and to a lesser extent Jordan) faced intense social 
and political instability within their own states as a result of the large populations 
of displaced Syrians. Turkey built a wall on its border with Syria in an attempt to 
stem the flow and prevent fighting amongst Turkish authorities, Arab tribes, and 
Kurdish militia forces.76 By 2014, Lebanon hosted a refugee population of one 
million, a quarter of its own population. When ISIS took Mosul in June 2014, 
                                                 
75 "Syrian Refugees Timeline." European University Institute and Migration Policy Centre. 2016.  
76 Ibid. 
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500,000 Iraqis fled. By the end of the month, ISIS declared itself a caliphate and 
1.2 million more Iraqis fled.  
It quickly became clear that the Syrian refugee crisis was placing undue 
and unsustainable hardship on Middle Eastern states. Riots and protests over 
deplorable living conditions in the camps were commonplace. Despite attempts to 
deliver aid, budgets and resources consistently fell short. In October 2014, Jordan 
refused to accept any more refugees. 
The UNHCR, joined by EU Home Affairs minister Cecilia Malmstrom, 
began urging European states to increase their quotas and accept more refugees. 
The UNCHR set a target goal for 30,000 resettled refugees by the end of 2014. 
Germany pledged to resettle 5,000 refugees for a period of 2 years, and Sweden 
offered residency to refugees. Germany was also the first EU member state to 
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truly open its doors to refugees by suspending the 1990 Dublin Regulation, which 
put the onus for registration and asylum claim evaluations on the country first 
entered by the refugee.77  
The increased willingness of EU member states to accept refugees and the 
deplorable and unsustainable conditions of camps within the Middle East led 
many refugees to seek asylum in the EU. This, coupled with the increase in 
violence stemming from the rise of ISIS, can also explain the shift towards the 
Eastern Mediterranean route as the preferred migration route. For Syrians, Iraqis, 
and Afghans leaving through Turkey is both quicker and safer than attempting to 
reach Libya (whose instability makes it a less desirable transit country than 
Turkey) and cross via the Central Mediterranean route. Finally, the “relaxation of 
Turkey’s visa rules towards many African countries has created another pull 
factor for migrants from this continent, who arrive in Turkey by plane before 
attempting entry into the EU.”78  
The Crisis 
This section will present a brief history of the crisis, including numbers 
and statistics on arrivals and where they are from. Frontex categorizes arrival to 
Europe by land and sea by eight main migratory routes; Western African route, 
                                                 
77 European Union. "Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)". Official Journal of 
the European Union. L (180/31). 29 June 2013.  
78 Katsiaficas, Caitlin. "Asylum Seeker and Migrant Flows in the Mediterranean Adapt Rapidly to 
Changing Conditions." Migration Policy Institute. 22 June 2016.  
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Western Mediterranean route, Central Mediterranean route, Apulia and Calabria 
route, Circular route from Albania to Greece, Western Balkan route, Eastern 
Mediterranean route, and Eastern Borders route. The ethnic, socioeconomic, and 
legal statuses of the people on the routes vary, as do the responses of the states 
receiving these people. This section will focus on the two most heavily used 
routes, namely the Central Mediterranean route (which will include the Apulia 
and Calabria route), as well as the Eastern Mediterranean route and its connection 
with the Western Balkan route.  
 
Central Mediterranean Route (including Apulia and Calabria route) 
Southern European states have experienced waves of irregular migration 
for decades. Prior to 2010, the majority of migrants attempted to enter the EU by 
arriving by boat from Libya on Italy’s shores. Libya had a prosperous economy 
that provided job opportunities for migrant workers from other African countries 
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who used it as either a final destination or “a transit country where they could 
earn money to pay the smugglers for the last leg of their journey to the EU.”79 
Frontex detected around 40,000 people in 2008, mostly nationals of Tunisia, 
Nigeria, Somalia, and Eritrea who had landed on the islands of Lampedusa and 
Malta from Libya.80  
Italy responded by the renewal of a bilateral agreement with Libya that 
required Libya to accept unauthorized migrants found in Italian coastal waters. 
This agreement reduced the number of people arriving on Italian shores to 4,500 
in 2010 by reinforcing and renewing funding for operations. Many in Europe 
believed Italy had found a solution (even if a morally questionable one) to 
unauthorized migration. The issue was placed on the backburner.  
The rise of the Arab Spring and protests in Tunisia, Algeria, Oman, 
Yemen, Syria, Morocco, and Egypt in early 2011 demonstrated that the quelling 
of Southern European states’ concerns on immigration was premature. Between 
January and March of 2011, around 23,000 Tunisians arrived on Lampedusa. By 
August, they were joined by 40,000 more people from sub-Saharan Africa, many 
of whom were seeking asylum after being forcibly expelled by Qaddafi’s regime. 
By the end of 2011, the governments of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar 
Qaddafi of Libya had been overthrown. The collapse of the Qaddafi regime 
nullified the 2009 treaty with Italy, though migrant detections by Frontex 
remained low in 2012 as smuggling networks were disrupted by Libyan state 
                                                 
79 "Trends and Routes: Central Mediterranean Route." European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 
2017. Accessed 1 April 2017.  
80 Ibid. 
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instability. The continued lack of law enforcement and the increase in demand for 
smugglers that resulted from neighbouring states’ instability led 2014 to become a 
peak year for migration, with 170,760 persons entering Italy.81 Then, in 2015, 
Italy experienced some relative respite as a variety of previously discussed push 
and pull factors drew the favoured migration route eastwards. 
Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan route 
Like the Central Mediterranean route, the Eastern Mediterranean route 
was active long before the crisis in 2015. The Eastern Mediterranean route, 
particularly via Greece, was the gateway to the Western Balkan route. Those who 
completed the journey across the Mediterranean safely land on the shores of an 
Eastern Aegean island (the three biggest entry points are the islands of Lesvos, 
Chios, and Samos).82   Upon arrival, refugees are registered with Frontex. They 
are then transferred to the mainland, through the Piraeus port in Athens. They 
would then travel up to Greece’s northern border with Macedonia, where they 
would continue through Serbia, Hungary, and Austria to reach either France or 
Germany. The journey is an arduous one that can take many days.  
                                                 
81 Ibid.  
82 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency." UNHCR 
News. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. 
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In 2008-2009, the route accounted for 40% of all migrants arriving in the 
EU, or about 40,000 people.83 Migrants arrived by sea, crossing from Turkish 
coastal towns like Bodrum and Izmir to Aegean islands like Lesvos and Moria. 
Others arrived by the land border between Greece and Turkey, a 12km stretch of 
the River Evros near Orestiada. Like Libya, Turkey hosts a thriving network of 
smugglers. By 2010, the number of unauthorized crossings had risen to 55,700.84 
The majority of these migrants came from Iraq and Afghanistan, and were 
seeking asylum.85  
Greece responded with a series of border control measures. A fence was 
built at Orestiada, and Frontex launched the first Rapid Border Intervention Team 
(RABIT) in November 2010 at the request of the Greek authorities. RABIT 
managed to achieve a 76% reduction between the average daily numbers of 
                                                 
83 "Trends and Routes: Eastern Mediterranean Route." European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 
2017. Accessed 1 April 2017.  
84 "Trends and Routes: Eastern Mediterranean Route." European Border and Coast Guard Agency.  
85 Ibid. 
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crossings between October 2010 and February 2011. The RABIT team also 
arrested 34 “facilitators” during this period.86 The operation ended in March 
2011, and was replaced by the ongoing Joint Operation Poseidon. Continued 
implementation of border patrols and Operation Poseidon led the number of 
unauthorized border crossings to drop to 24,800 in 2013.  
Unlike Italy, the early years of the Arab Spring did not have as great an 
effect on migration numbers for the Eastern Mediterranean route. Middle Eastern 
states bore the brunt of the exodus from Syria as its civil war escalated. Syrians 
began leaving, mainly for Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan in 2011. By the end of 
2012, 500,000 Syrians had been displaced. Just nine months later, in September 
2013, that number had more than quadrupled to 2,000,000. The number of 
internally displaced people stood at 4.25 million.87 
The great majority of these Syrians remained in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, 2013 was also the year Syrians overtook 
Afghans as the nationality comprising the largest percentage of new arrivals, and 
2014 was the first time since 2009 more new immigrants had arrived by sea rather 
than land.88  
                                                 
86 Frontex. “RABIT Operation 2010 Ends, Replaced by JO Poseidon 2011.” Frontex News. 3 
March 2011. Warsaw. Accessed 4 April 2017.  
87 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency." 
88Katsiaficas, Caitlin. "Asylum Seeker and Migrant Flows in the Mediterranean Adapt Rapidly to 
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The peak of the crisis hit in 2015, when over one million89 migrants and 
refugees arrived in Europe -- three to four times more than 2014.90 Greece 
overtook Italy as the primary point of arrival, and the great majority arrived by 
sea in Greece (816,752), with just 3% (34,215) arriving by land to Bulgaria and 
Greece. Half were Syrian, 20% were from Afghanistan, and 7% were from Iraq.91 
2015 was also the year that Amnesty International named the Mediterranean Sea 
the “deadliest sea route for migrants.”92 In 2015, the death toll reached 3,771 
despite search and rescue missions carried out by Frontex and Greek, Italian, and 
Turkish coast guards.93 Due to the longer journey and rougher waters, most of 
these deaths occurred in the Central Mediterranean.   
Following a variety of state and regional responses to the refugee crisis 
(most notably the EU-Turkey deal in March), numbers of arrivals for 2016 
dropped to 387,487 for all of Europe. Tragically, the death toll did not follow a 
similar trend. 2016 was labelled the deadliest year yet for the Mediterranean, with 
the death toll soaring to 5,079.94 These numbers are disturbingly anomalous. The 
astronomical death toll counters the narrative that the low arrival number presents 
by offering a darker explanation. Numbers of people attempting to make the 
                                                 
89 According to IOM, the exact number is 1,046,599 people. 
90 "Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: IOM". IOM. 22 
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91 "A million refugees and migrants flee to Europe in 2015". UNHCR. 22 December 2015.  
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93 "A million refugees and migrants flee to Europe in 2015". UNHCR. 
94 Azizov, Sharof. "Refugees and Terrorism: 'No Evidence of Risk' - New Report by UN Expert 
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crossing into Europe have declined slower than the arrival rate would suggest, 
because the increased land and maritime border control operations have forced 
refugees to take more and more dangerous routes and crossings in order to avoid 
Frontex and various other government forces. Rather than secure the border and 
protect refugees, the crackdown of fortress Europe has served to exacerbate death 
tolls and put refugees in harm’s way.  
Many within Europe spew a rhetoric similar to that found in the United 
States regarding refugees -- it is impossible to know or differentiate who amongst 
them are terrorists in disguise, and who are truly ‘refugees’ (a problematic 
statement in itself). Interestingly, the United Nations Human Rights office 
recently conducted a study on the relationship between increased border 
protection measures, refugees, and instances of radicalisation and/or terrorist acts 
or plots. In a meeting at the UN General Assembly in October 2016, Special 
Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, Ben Emmerson, warned 
“overly-restrictive migration policies introduced because of terrorism concerns 
are not justified and may in fact be damaging to state security.”95 The report went 
further to claim that perceived linkages between terrorism and refugees is 
“statistically and analytically unfounded.”96 
In fact, the report found that migration policies that build fences, engage in 
push-back operations, criminalize irregular migration and abandon international 
legal commitments to refugees, lead to restricted access to safe territory and 
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96 Ibid. 
 53 
 
increased covert movements of people, particularly by traffickers. These are 
conditions which may ultimately assist terrorists and lead to increased terrorist 
activity.97 
To many, this may seem logical. After all, many of the refugees arriving 
on Europe’s shores and fleeing terrorist organisations in their darkest forms, 
whether it is ISIS, Boko Haram, or al Shabab. Many refugees risk their lives and 
security in the hopes of reaching greater freedom and security in Europe, only to 
find themselves demonized, placed in atrocious conditions, and turned away. 
Placed in such dire straits, the rhetoric of a hypocritical and evil West espoused 
by terrorist organisations may seem to hold more weight.  
Current border policies appear to be failing at protecting refugees, 
protecting European citizens from terrorism, and seem to be fairly ineffective. So, 
why do these policies continue on their trajectory? The next chapter will attempt 
to put these policies in a historical and political context in order to understand 
how and why the European Union responded to the crisis in the way it did.  
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4 
European Borders: History and Analysis 
 
Europe’s refugee crisis occurred in a very unique set of circumstances, 
particularly when one considers the pre-existing border regime. Before the 
refugee crisis happened, Europe was an experiment in open internal borders, and 
the experiment seemed to be going well. Europe had set up a system of joint 
border control based largely off the 1985 Schengen Agreement. Border 
management policies, though they severely limited member states’ autonomy and 
sovereignty, were designed to uphold the principles enshrined in the Schengen 
Agreement and was codified into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Asylum 
policy in the EU followed a similar formula. By the time the refugee crisis struck, 
Schengen norms were largely accepted by the European community. However, 
the sudden inflow of people placed considerable strain on these norms, as 
countries fought to regain control over sovereignty lost through several policies, 
such as the reintroduction of temporary border controls. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first will put the details and 
statistics of the previous chapter on the refugee crisis in the greater historical 
context of EU border policies and norms. The second section examines Europe’s 
reaction to the crisis once it had hit its peak, through examining EU-wide attitudes 
as embodied in European Council conclusions (the direction of the road), and the 
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specific policies enacted by member states (the bricks that build the road). Finally, 
I argue that the border regime produced by the refugee crisis is one that can 
increasingly be defined by the externalisation, militarisation, privatisation, and 
centralisation of border controls.  
The European Border Regime 
Legal Context: Treaties 
The EU border regime, like all other laws in the EU, rests upon two core 
functional treaties; the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the 
Treaty on European Union (originally signed in Maastricht in 1992). 
The Treaty of Rome was signed in Rome in 1957 as the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). The treaty outlined the 
bases of the EEC as the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital 
through the gradual elimination of customs duties.98 It also proposed common 
policies on agriculture and transport,99 as well as common rules, economic policy, 
and social policy.100 Finally, the treaty outlined the governing institutions of the 
community (including the assembly, council, commission, and court of justice -- 
institutions that have many similarities with the ECSC).101 
                                                 
98 European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version), Rome 
Treaty, 25 March 1957. Accessed 31 March 2017. Therein after TEEC. TEEC, Part 2 Title I, Title 
III. 
99 TEEC, Part 2 Title II, Title IV. 
100 TEEC, Part 3, Title I, Title II, Title III. 
101 TEEC, Part 5, Title I. 
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The success of the EEC was dependent on its member states ceding some 
control of its authority (and thus its sovereignty) to a supranational body. As the 
EEC began to prove its worth, its membership and economic power grew. 
Denmark, Ireland, and the UK joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981, and 
Portugal and Spain in 1986. As membership expanded, so did the scope for policy 
convergence.  
Despite the relative successes of the EEC, Europe in the 1980s was 
experiencing a decade of “economic stagnation and institutional deadlock.”102 
François Mitterrand of France, and Helmut Kohl of Germany spearheaded an 
initiative to rejuvenate the economy at a conference in Schengen, Luxembourg. 
The plan called for the abolition of internal border controls, the deepening of a 
common market, further economic liberalisation, and the creation of a regional 
European identity complete with a European passport, flag, and anthem.103 104  
The proposal was a radical departure from what was considered common 
sense norms105 regarding national sovereignty and territory, despite the shifts 
towards such a conceptualisation that began in the 1950s.106 Nevertheless, the 
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proposal quickly gained momentum. On June 14, 1985, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
(five of the ten members of the EEC) signed the Schengen Agreement. 
The Schengen Agreement had three main tenets. Firstly, that the 
agreement would create a common EU territory without internal borders, and 
delineated by a common external border. Secondly, entry into the Schengen zone 
via an external border constitutes admission to the whole territory, regardless of 
citizenship status. Finally, once admitted to the Schengen zone, a person is 
entitled to move freely for a period of three months out of every six without 
further checks at internal borders of participating states.107 
The Schengen Agreement was quickly followed up with the Single 
European Act (SEA), signed on 17 February 1986, and came into effect on 1 
July 1987. The SEA was the first major revision to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. It 
tasked the European Community with the objective of establishing a single 
market by 1992, adopted more collaborative legislative processes amongst 
European states, and codified European Political Cooperation. Although the SEA 
did not have any direct influence on borders, it expanded the scope of European 
cooperation to include not only economics and the movement of people, but also 
foreign policy -- a policy area that typically is confined to decisions of the state. 
                                                 
107 European Union. “Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
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Signatories to the Schengen agreement recognised that the agreement 
itself was broad, and lacked the necessary operationalising clauses to lead to 
implementation. Thus, the Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, signed on 19 June 1990, was created as a detailed roadmap to direct 
member states to the abolition of internal border control. Some requirements 
include: 
1). The creation of a common EU territory, delineated by a 
common external border, and without internal border 
checks,108 including the movement of aliens with valid 
visas;109  
2). Entry into the Schengen zone through an external border 
constitutes admission to the territory as a whole, and 
entry is subject to checks by competent 
authorities;1103). The introduction of a uniform visa 
valid for the entire territory of the contracting parties;111 
4). The coordination of the responsibility for processing 
applications for asylum, compliant with countries’ 
obligations under the Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951;112 
5). The cross border cooperation and mutual assistance of 
police and security, especially regarding extradition, 
narcotics, firearms, and ammunition;113  
6). The creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
database in order to maintain public policy and public 
security and communicate information regarding 
persons of concern or persons who constitute a ‘security 
risk’ pursuant to Article 96;114 
7). Promotion of the facilitation and harmonious regulation 
of goods at internal borders.115 
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Both Schengen agreements came into force on 26 March 1995, effectively 
abolishing border controls between Belgium, Germany, France, Luxemburg, and 
the Netherlands, as well as for two new states, Spain and Portugal.  
Despite the significance of the Schengen agreement as a trailblazer, the 
most defining agreement to come out of this era was the Maastricht Treaty 
(formally the Treaty on European Union, or TEU). The fall of communism, 
outlook on German reunification, and optimism about the gains achieved through 
the SEA created a desire to reinforce and supplement the EC’s international 
position and consolidate their unity. Two intergovernmental conferences 
convened, one tasked with investigating the viability of an economic and 
monetary union (EMU) and the other on the viability of a political union. The two 
conferences culminated in December 1991 with the Maastricht Summit, and the 
treaty went into force in November 1993.116 
The TEU is most famous for its creation of the European Union as it is 
known today. The TEU created a European Union based on three pillars: The 
European Community (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Justice and Home Affairs, or 
JHA). The Treaty introduces the concept of European citizenship, reinforces the 
powers of the European Parliament and launches economic and monetary union 
(EMU).117 None of these pillars were new, rather they were extensions of existing 
institutions. 
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Since the TEU is most famous for the EMU and EU foundation, it is often 
overlooked or forgotten that the TEU introduced a new policy arena into the 
institutional framework: the common migration policy. The policy fell under the 
JHA pillar,118 and refers to third country (non-EU) nationals in a common asylum 
and immigration policy, and a common external border control.119 Migration 
management had been a high priority for European nations since the beginning of 
the 1990s, and was only exacerbating by the disintegration of the USSR.120 The 
migration dimension of the TEU is reflective of the rising importance of 
migration and border control on the EU radar. 
The TEU expanded the freedom of movement that had already been 
granted labourers to include all citizens of the newly created common European 
citizenship. While most countries were in agreement with the free movement of 
EU citizens, many were unwilling to limit their sovereignty on control of non-EU 
citizen entry. Indeed, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark do not take part in measures 
of the TEU relating to freedom, security, and justice.  
The Schengen Agreement and the TEU are perhaps the most foundational 
documents of today’s European border and migration policies. They were 
cautious first steps, fraught with disagreement, concerns over sovereignty, and 
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hesitancy. Nevertheless, European states’ demonstrated their willingness to begin 
to take the steps towards a radical reconceptualization of regional borders and its 
implications for migration. As the EU began to expand, these nascent norms 
expanded and entrenched themselves in the institutions and norms of the EU. 
Schengen norms culminated in its codification into EU law with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 2 October 1997 and effective on 1 May 1999. By 
incorporating the Schengen Agreement into the EU legal and institutional 
framework, members’ implementation processes were opened to parliamentary 
and judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, it ensured democratic control by giving 
citizens accessible legal remedies when their rights were challenged. The UK and 
Ireland opted to remain outside of the Schengen Area.  
In addition to incorporating Schengen principles, the Amsterdam Treaty 
forced member states to devolve certain powers from the state to the regional 
European Parliament. These powers included adopting a common immigration 
and asylum policy, certain civil and criminal laws, environmental laws, and the 
enactment of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).121  
The Amsterdam Treaty was not without its flaws. It left many institutional 
questions open, and raised concerns about the ability of the Amsterdam Treaty’s 
reforms to facilitate an Eastward expansion of the EU, and weighting of the 
member states’ votes. The concerns were not unfounded, especially as the entry 
into the EU of former communist states was already being discussed. These 
                                                 
121 European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts [hereinafter Treaty of 
Amsterdam]. October 2 1997. 
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concerns were eventually pacified by the Treaty of Nice,122 that was signed in 
2001 and entered into force in 2003, that amended some of the structural 
dissonances that inhibited a smooth expansion. 
Whilst these changes were occurring, the EU was shifting and expanding 
to meet the needs and desires of other European nation states. Several factors, 
especially the creation of several new European states following the collapse of 
communism and the dissolution of the USSR, led to seven enlargements of the 
EU. In just sixty years, the EU went from its original six members -- the Benelux 
states, France, Germany, and Italy -- to 28 member states.  
The Treaty of Nice preceded the fifth expansion of the EU, which was 
enacted in May 2004. With it, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary were welcomed into the EU 
bringing the total number of member states from 15 to 25. In 2007, the EU 
experienced another enlargement which now included Bulgaria and Romania. By 
this time, the Schengen rules had been incorporated into the EU body of law. 
Accession to the EU meant acceptance of the Schengen border regime by default.  
With this, the EU’s external land borders shifted from the boundaries of 
Germany, Italy, and Austria to the external land borders of Slovenia, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Estonia. The new 
peripheral states were significantly poorer and lacking in infrastructure than their 
Western European counterparts, and their decreased capacity to control their 
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borders caused consternation and unease amongst members of the EU. This 
concern was mitigated by the development of various border management 
strategies. 
 
The final treaty relating to the EU is the Treaty of Lisbon, previously 
known as the Reform Treaty, which was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 
2009. The Treaty of Lisbon is the most recent treaty, and set up the current 
structure of the EU outlined in Chapter 2.  
Border Management Policies 
The poor border management infrastructure of newly inducted Eastern 
European member states caused concern amongst wealthier Western European 
states. It also heralded in a new era in the EU’s policy -- that of a coordinated and 
unified approach to border control and management. At its meeting in Tampere in 
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1999, the European Council adopted the “first multi-annual programme of 
priorities in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA), which included the aim of 
establishing a common EU asylum and migration policy.”123  
This policy set open internal borders as its goal through emphasising the 
importance of the Schengen acquis, and encouraged the EU to develop common 
asylum and immigration policies. Furthermore, the Council called for closer “co-
operation and mutual technical assistance between the Member States' border 
control,” and stressed “the importance of the effective control of the Union's 
future external borders by specialised trained professionals.”124  
This meeting put border control on the EU agenda, and drew attention to 
holes in their policy. In June 2002, the JHA Council drew up a plan for the 
management of the external borders of the Member States of the EU in an attempt 
to address these holes. This plan devised a common policy for managing external 
borders under the strategy of Integrated Border Management (IBM). IBM is a 
strategy that involves interagency, international, and intra-service cooperation 
amongst host states, origin states, and transit states.125 The JHA outlines five key 
measures that require consideration in pursuit of IBM: a common corpus of 
legislation, a common coordination and operational cooperation mechanism, 
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common integrated risk analysis, staff and interoperational equipment, and 
burden-sharing between Member States.126 
This meeting also led to the creation of the External Border 
Practitioners Common Unit -- a group composed of members of the Strategic 
Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and heads of national 
border control services.127 The Common Unit coordinated national projects of 
Ad-Hoc Centres on Border Control.128 Their task was to oversee EU-wide pilot 
projects and common operations related to external border management.129 
Despite the advances in cooperative management precipitated by IBM, the 
strategy was not without its weaknesses. As Marenin notes, “IBM requires a clear 
policy statement naming the institutions and practices which will have to be 
integrated; plans on how the integration process will be implemented, by whom 
and in what sequence have to be written; and success criteria for evaluating 
progress towards IBM have to be designed and validated.”130 Although achieving 
all these considerations would be manageable between two states, it became 
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nearly impossible to accommodate the multiple interests of 27 member states and 
the European Community as a whole.131 
The problems of IBM and the 2002 JHC plan led EU member states to 
take a more drastic step, and on 26 October 2004 a Council Regulation 
established the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, or its better 
known Italian acronym, Frontex.132  
According to the Council Regulation, Frontex’s main tasks were; 
coordinating cooperation between member states in external border management, 
assisting member states in training of national border guards, carrying out risk 
analyses, following research relevant for the control and surveillance of external 
borders, helping member states who require technical and operational assistance 
at external borders, and providing member states with the necessary support in 
organising joint return operations.133 Frontex has since been involved in several 
operations in the land, air, and sea that are aimed at securing the EU’s borders. It 
was replaced by the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) in October 2016.  
Despite its inception in 1985, it was not until 2006 that Schengen 
principles embodied themselves in a concrete set of rules and definitions. The 
Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 562/2006) outlined the common rules 
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133 European Union. "Council Regulation establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
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governing the movement of persons across borders. The Code defines internal 
borders as “the common land borders, including river and lake borders of the 
Member States; the airports of the Member States for internal flights; sea, river 
and lake ports of the Member States for regular ferry connections.”134 The 
external border is defined as those borders that are not internal borders.135 This 
definition defines external borders exclusively by reference to internal borders. 
Article 4 of the Code clearly states that the external borders of the EU may 
only be crossed at designated border crossing points at the hours permitted, with 
some derogations for pleasure boating, coastal fishing, seamen going ashore, 
groups of a special nature and unforeseen emergencies.136 All crossings that occur 
outside these places, times, or circumstances are illegal. Thus begins the 
criminalisation of border crossings.  
Interestingly, the relationship between Frontex’s list of tasks, and the 
Schengen borders code is non-existent, for the simple reason that Frontex predates 
the Code. Frontex makes no mention of either the common EU external frontier 
nor the internal borders. As Bigo and Guild note, “This means that Frontex was 
established as the EU’s external border agency before the EU had defined or 
given a legal definition to its external frontier let alone who and how individuals 
should be able to cross that frontier. A second important aspect of the task of 
FRONTEX is the degree to which is it tied to the Member States. The agency’s 
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job is not related to the European Commission or the Council or the European 
Parliament. The funding which it receives from those sources, which doubled 
between 2006 and 2007 from €19,166,300 to €42,150,30020, is not related to how 
it carries out the EU’s definition of the borders but rather to how the Member 
States perceive the needs of external border management. It is not surprising that 
as a result there is something of a chasm between the rules of the Schengen 
Borders Code and the actions of FRONTEX. They are not coordinated, nor is 
there any clear point of intersection between the two.”137 
In 2008, Franco Frattini, the Justice, Security and Freedom Commissioner 
and Vice-President of the European Commission, ordered an evaluation of and 
outlook for Frontex as part of the European Commission’s so-called Border 
Package. The package, entitled “A comprehensive vision for an integrated 
European border management system for the 21st century” was comprised of 
three parts. The first was Frontex’s evaluation. The second part addressed the 
establishment of the European border surveillance system (EUROSUR), that 
aimed to integrate existing drone, satellite, and radar technologies to promote 
information coordination through a centralised database.138 The third part 
discussed the creation of an entry register, which in turn raised concerns about the 
reach of Frontex’s authority.139 
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As all these developments occurred at the EU-level, several member states 
were experimenting with their own strategies for border management unilaterally. 
A few of these policies are of particular note, as they served to influence EU-wide 
policy later on. One such example is that of Italy’s bilateral cooperation with 
Libya.  
Arrivals of unauthorized migrants on Sicily and the Sicilian islands rose 
from 2,782 people in 2000 to 13,594 people in 2004.140 The majority of these 
people arrived via Libya. Italy and Libya had been engaged in bilateral 
cooperation since the 1990s over issues of migration and border controls, albeit 
somewhat delicately due to Libya’s status as a rogue state sanctioned by the UN 
and the EU. The first agreement was signed in December 2000 aimed at fighting 
terrorism, organized crime, and undocumented immigration, followed by 
subsequent agreements in 2003 and 2004 under the presidency of Silvio 
Berlusconi.141  
 The agreements established a system in which Italy financed charter 
flights to remove undocumented migrants from Italian soil and return them to 
home countries. Italy provided technical equipment and training programs to 
reinforce and strengthen the Libyan border in attempt to stem migration from its 
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source.142 Furthermore, Italy constructed camps for undocumented migrants in 
Gharyan, Kufra, and Sebah, Libya.143  
The deal was criticised by European Parliament at the time as 
demonstrating a disregard for human rights (particularly towards asylum seekers 
detained in closed centres), a violation of the principle of non refoulement, and 
subversive cooperation with an international pariah. Thirteen NGOs appealed to 
the European Commission to sanction Italy.144   
However, the subsequent actions of the EU made it clear their criticisms 
were largely political posturing. The conclusion to the Commission’s 2005 report 
recommended conditional cooperation with Libya on migration issues pursuant to 
reform of its asylum and detention systems as well as recognition of the 
UNHCR.145   
The EU’s willingness to embrace Italy’s relations with Libya coincides 
with its adoption of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 
strategy. The GAMM is the overarching framework of the EU external migration 
and asylum policy, and defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and 
cooperation with non-EU countries. The GAMM’s agenda attempts to target four 
main objectives; “better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed 
mobility; preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating 
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trafficking in human beings; maximising the development impact of migration 
and mobility; and promoting international protection, and enhancing the external 
dimension of asylum.”146 The GAMM is implemented through various political 
instruments (most notably the mobility partnerships and common agendas for 
migration and mobility), legal instruments, operational support, and capacity 
building with third countries and other stakeholders (such as civil society and 
international organisations).147 
The GAMM was particularly non-traditional in its approach to border 
management. The GAMM and the various partnerships that lie under de-
territorialized the physical frontiers of Europe and extended the reach of the EU 
as an institution (and, in some cases, Frontex) into the sovereign realm of non-
member states.  
The GAMM strategy has grown rapidly since the time of its inception in 
2005. By 2013, over one billion Euros had been committed to the pursuance of 
both mobility partnerships and common agenda on migration and mobility to 
more than 400 projects. 
Nine mobility partnerships have been signed so far, with Cape Verde, the 
Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan, Tunisia, Jordan, 
and Belarus. Establishment of a MP often includes the negotiation of visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements, and are used vis-à-vis neighbourhood 
countries. 
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The common agenda on migration and mobility is presented as an 
alternative framework for countries who do not wish to enter into the full set of 
obligations and commitments that a mobility partnership entails. Like the mobility 
partnerships, a Common Agenda would set targets and recommendations for 
dialogue and cooperation, but without the full set of obligations and 
commitments. It may be upgraded to a mobility partnership at a later stage, and 
the EU has signed Common Agenda’s with Ethiopia and Nigeria. 
Both the mobility partnerships and the common agendas are established by 
“joint political declarations between the EU and interested Member States, on the 
one hand, and the partner country on the other. Both are based on mutual 
commitments, while remaining formally non-binding.” (2011 document). 
As stated in the 2011 report on the functioning of the GAMM to the 
European Council, “the Global Approach also provides an appropriate framework 
for addressing the role of the EU in global migration and mobility governance. 
The Global Approach allows the EU to speak with one voice on migration and 
mobility matters at a global level.” This sentiment is clearly indicative of the 
unified direction of EU policies on migration and, by extension, border policy.  
When Frontex began its work in 2005, it was entering into a field well 
prepared. Increased support in public opinion for a strongly defended external 
border and open internal borders necessitated EU-wide cooperation, and so a 
centralised organisation like Frontex seemed like the logical approach to achieve 
such goals. The external borders practitioner’s common unit, the various Ad Hoc 
centres, SCIFA, and the various other agencies set up within member states to 
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comply with Schengen rules provided an infrastructure that Frontex only needed 
to unite. Furthermore, the global technology boom of the early 21st century had 
extended its reach into border management practices. The Schengen Information 
System, EURODAC,148 EUROSUR, the external surveillance integrated system, 
reconnaissance drones, and various other technologies made the implementation 
and centralisation of stringent border control measures an achievable reality.  
By the end of 2009, this reality had almost entirely arrived. The EU had 
assumed much of its modern day form, and has spent much of this past decade 
consolidating itself as both an entity and an identity. Since the Treaty of Lisbon 
came into force in 2009, there have been no major treaties that have reshaped the 
functioning of the EU. The biggest change in the EU composition has been that of 
the UK’s referendum vote to leave the EU, colloquially known as Brexit, on 23 
June 2016. The formal process of the UK’s withdrawal will be completed in two 
years, following the negotiation of an exit plan. Brexit has been followed by 
rising separatist sentiments throughout Europe, often voiced by far right nativist 
parties such as National Front leader, Marine Le Pen of France. 
 In the past decade, the EU has also consolidated many of its border 
policies. At a meeting of the European Council on 27 June 2014, a set of strategic 
guidelines were adopted by the Justice and Home Affair Committee. These 
guidelines were focused on five key policy items: the protection and promotion of 
fundamental rights; migration, asylum, and borders; security, combatting crime 
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and terrorism; judicial cooperation; and free movement. As concerning borders, 
the European Council called to “modernise border management in a cost-
efficient way; reinforce the assistance provided by Frontex and the new 
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur); study the possibility of 
setting up a European system of border guards; and modernise the common 
visa policy.”149 
 As the refugee crisis steadily gained momentum, particularly from 2013 to 
its peak in mid-2015, the ideals and theoretical approaches to border controls 
were put to the test in the face of reality. These approaches, set against the 
backdrop of half a century of changing attitudes towards European borders, 
provide the historical context necessary for a deeper understanding of the EU’s 
response to the refugee crisis. 
EU-Wide Responses 
Europe’s refugee crisis prompted a flurry of developments in border 
control and policy as both states and institutions fought to manage a crisis. Each 
member state had varying attitudes and responses to the crisis depending on a 
variety of factors, including their geography, demographics, and socioeconomic 
status. In order to gauge the overall attitudes towards the crisis and separate 
national politics from EU politics, we can look to the European Council 
conclusions.   
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The European Council is comprised of the Heads of State or Government 
from each Member State, the President of the European Council (currently 
Donald Tusk), and the President of the European Commission (currently Jean-
Claude Juncker). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (currently Federica Mogherini) also takes part in the meetings. 
The Council meets four times per year, with additional meetings called to address 
urgent issues. 
The European Council does not adopt legislation, they are simply 
responsible for defining the political direction and priorities of the EU. At the end 
of each meeting, the European Council issues ‘conclusions’ that are reached 
through consensus, and in special instances qualified majority voting (although 
only the Heads of State or Government may cast a vote).  
The conclusions issued by the Council are key indicators of attitudes and 
priorities amongst EU members at any given time. The presence or absence of an 
issue, as well as the recommendations given to the European Commission for 
proposals to address a particular challenge or opportunity, provide a gauge for 
mainstream perspectives and opinions. These conclusions provide the roadmap 
for the policies enacted by individual member states that will be discussed in the 
next section. 
European Council Conclusions 
The EU first began paying serious consideration to the issue of migration 
flows in 2013. On 3 October 2013, a boat with at least 515 people on board sank 
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near Lampedusa. The Italian Coast Guard rescued 155 survivors.150 This incident 
was the largest loss of life that had occurred yet, and was followed just a week 
later with yet another capsized boat and 34 more deaths.151 The European Council 
was scheduled to meet from 24-25 October, however a day before the meeting 
news broke of the NSA’s tap of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone, 
scattering attention and eclipsing refugee deaths in the Mediterranean. The 
summit paid some lip-service to the issue, denouncing the events as tragedies and 
calling for the reinforcement of cooperation with IOM, UNHCR, and origin 
countries, the strengthening of Frontex, and swift implementation of EUROSUR, 
though ultimately relegated discussion of a long term strategy to June 2014.152  
In December 2013 the European Council held a thematic debate on 
defence for the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
European Council emphasised the importance of developing a stronger Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the “agreed framework of the 
strategic partnership between the EU and NATO” and the need to develop a 
“more integrated, sustainable, innovative, and competitive European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).”153 They further stated that doing so 
required “increased synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors 
to tackle horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organised crime and 
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terrorism, [and] progress in developing CSDP support for third states and regions, 
in order to help them to improve border management.”154 
The conclusions also discussed migration flows, though briefly. The 
European Council welcomed the Commission’s 38-point operational action plan, 
called for increased engagement with third countries, information campaigns, 
regional protection programmes, mobility partnerships, and an effective return 
policy in addition to the reinforcement of Frontex border surveillance operations 
and actions. Once more, the European Council pushed serious discussion of short 
and long term policy solutions to June 2014.155 
The conclusions of June 2014 did indeed present policy directions, 
including a desire for increased cooperation with third countries, the development 
of a comprehensive and unified asylum and immigration policy, the effective 
implementation of the CEAS and reinforced support for EASO, and the need to 
protect the principles of Schengen through programs such as IBM and 
EUROSUR. Finally, the European Council called for a study of “the possibility of 
setting up a European system of border guards to enhance the control and 
surveillance capabilities at our external borders.”156 Conclusions were largely 
conceptual and lacking in operational action, in part due to Member States’ 
reluctance to commit resources to an issue that, at the time, was largely confined 
to Southern states.  
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That debate was the last mention of migration issues before the refugee 
crisis hit its peak, with the exception of an acknowledgement of smugglers and 
deaths at sea coupled with a call to increase Frontex’s Operation Triton157 in the 
conclusions March 2015. During this time, warning signs were already present. 
Deaths in the Mediterranean were on the rise, Italy was already struggling to cope 
with increased arrivals on its shore, its asylum system was inundated, and 
displaced populations within the Middle East were skyrocketing. Unfortunately, 
the presence of many other issues within the EU ranging from economic crises to 
energy issues made it difficult for migration to receive the attention it deserved at 
the EU level. This ultimately prevented the creation of a coordinated and 
organised strategy, so when crisis struck Europe suffered immensely from its lack 
of preparation. 
Issues of migration flows were explicitly addressed for the first time since 
December 2013 in the European Council conclusions of June 2015. Between June 
2015 and December 2016, it remained as the first item addressed in the 
conclusions. 
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Interestingly, European Council conclusions issued during the crisis itself 
contained many of the same themes and recommendations presented before the 
crisis. Major themes include: 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 
● Support for relocation/resettlement schemes,  
● Support for return/readmission/reintegration schemes,  
● Calls for increased cooperation with third countries (of origin and 
transit),  
● Calls to uphold and protect Schengen principles,  
● Support for CEAS and EASO,  
● Support for a reinforced and strengthened CSDP,  
● Calls for increased military or Frontex operations in the 
Mediterranean and on land borders, as well as use of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams,  
● Increased border surveillance, 
● Tougher stances on combatting smuggling networks, and  
● Calls for the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard 
(EBCG).  
 
These themes are indicative of the route the EU chose to take in response 
to the refugee crisis. The route is one that can be characterised as leading to the 
increasing externalisation, militarisation, privatisation, and centralisation of 
European border policy. Nevertheless, the European Council conclusions simply 
influence and guide EU policy -- they do not set it. In order to examine whether 
the trends present in the European Council conclusions mirror the facts on the 
ground, we must look to the legislation adopted by the EU as a whole as well as 
individual Member States. The embodiment of these trends in policy will be 
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presented in chapter 6, following a discussion of the defence industry, their role in 
the European economy, their lobbying activities, and the ways in which they have 
profited off of chaos in the origin countries of refugees.  
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5 
Defending Europe: The Industry, Lobby, and 
Crisis 
 
 This chapter will present some background and context on the European 
defence industry and lobby. I will begin by presenting some facts and figures on 
the defence industry, its significance to the EU, and some relevant policies. Next, 
I will present the major players in the defence industry, including information on 
their lobbying activities. Finally, I will examine the industry’s role in and 
relationship to the refugee crisis. This chapter seeks to set the stage for the final 
chapter of this thesis, which will synthesise the refugee crisis, trends in European 
border policy, and the defence industry/lobby in attempting to understand how 
this sector of European society has influenced policy outcomes.  
The European Defence Industry 
In 2013, it seemed to many that Europe’s defence industry was on the 
decline. Austerity measures forced many countries, particularly in Western 
Europe, to cut down on defence budgets. Since 2008, the EU has cut its cash 
spending on defence from €200 billion ($216 billion) per year to €170 billion 
($183 billion), and “most middle-sized countries have cut it by 10-15% in real 
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terms.”166 Yet industry issues do not stem from politics alone. Europe’s defence 
industry is organised largely on national lines, which in many cases has led to 
inefficient allocation of resources, high costs, and chronic overcapacity. These 
factors, coupled with declining military budgets and austerity measures, have 
impacted European defence industry’s capability to compete on price and it thus 
has lost out on exports abroad.167 Europe’s defence industry faced severe 
challenges and was considered to be a withering sector to many. 
Things soon began to change, as unrest in Ukraine, threat from militant 
organisations like the Islamic State, a rise in terror attacks like those in Paris and 
Brussels, and instability caused by the refugee crisis posed threats to European 
security. States responded by reversing some of the downward trends identified in 
2013 and ramping up defence spending in order to secure their borders and 
citizens.168 
Regardless of fluctuations in spending, defence (including aeronautics, 
land and naval systems, and electronics) remains a major industrial sector in 
Europe. Defence News releases a ranking each year of the top 100 defence 
companies in the world. 24 out of them are companies from EU states, and 5 more 
are Swiss, Turkish, or Norwegian companies who are not EU members but are 
still considered a part of the European defence market policy. 
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According to the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and Small 
and Medium Enterprises Commission, the industry as a whole “directly employs 
about 500,000 people, generates up to 1,200,000 indirect jobs, [and] had a 
turnover of €97,3 billion ($105 billion) in 2014.”171 In Deloitte’s 2017 global 
aerospace and defence sector outlook, they predict the European defence sector to 
record a 2.5% year over year increase in revenue and a 9.3% growth in operating 
earnings in the coming year.172  
 It should be noted that the €97.3 billion revenue figure from the European 
Commission does not come from Eurostat, the statistical bureau of the Union, but 
rather came from the defence industry itself -- namely the annual Facts & Figures 
info sheet released by the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of 
Europe (ASD). The European Parliament, on the other hand, uses a figure of €81 
billion, based on so-called “letter of intent” countries’ turnover in the same year. 
Both the figures of the Commission/ASD and the Parliament differ from a figure 
deduced from the Defence News top-100 of largest global defence firms, which 
puts the turnover of EU companies at just over €90 billion. Therefore, we can 
estimate the turnover of the industry to lie around €90 billion. 
Finally, part of the reason behind the enormous economic and political 
power the defence industry wields is due to the prevalence of partial or majority 
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state ownership of these companies. For example, Leonardo is partially owned by 
the Italian state, Thales is partially owned by the French state, and Airbus Group 
is partially owned by the French, German, and Spanish states.173 Naturally, the 
fact that these companies are state owned leads to a closer relationship between 
the industry and political forces at the national level. Despite this relationship, the 
“EU is increasingly becoming the focus of defence industry attention.”174  
Much of this results from the issues of inefficient resource allocation, high 
costs, and chronic overcapacity mentioned previously. As the Commission notes, 
“fragmented markets create red tape, hamper innovation, and lead to the 
duplication of defence programmes and research. This undermines Europe’s 
global competitiveness and the effectiveness of the EU’s CSDP.”175 Furthermore, 
the heavy regulation at the national level kept many defence industries out of the 
internal market, making them vulnerable to a shortage of skilled labourer. When 
many issues in your sector stem from national legislation, it is only logical to seek 
to address issues at a regional level and in doing bypass the national legislation of 
each country in which you operate or seek to expand into. Regional or EU-wide 
legislation is believed to create standards and encourage cooperation and free 
trade amongst members. Interestingly, such a shift clearly correlates with the 
observations of the “Europeanisation” process. 
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174 Ibid. 
175 European Union. “Defence Industries.” 
 86 
 
Clearly, the industry plays a large role in Europe’s economic growth. The 
spill over into civil sectors resulting from its investments in innovation and 
research have led many to believe the industry is crucial to the economic -- and 
physical -- security of Europe.176  
Relevant Policies 
When discussing the European defence industry, there are three policies 
that are key to understanding the institutional landscape in which the industry 
operates; the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), and the European Security Research 
Programme. 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under a Joint 
Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July, 2004. It was founded in order “to 
support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European 
defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European 
Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future.”  
The EDA is financed by its members in proportion to their Gross National 
Income, with a budget of €30.5 million in 2015.177 The main functions of the 
EDA are: 
1. Developing defence capabilities; 
2. Promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation; 
3. Creating an internationally competitive European defence equipment 
market; and 
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4. Enhancing the effectiveness of European defence Research and 
Technology (R&T).”178 
 
The EDA attempts to achieve its goals through the implementation of four 
strategies. The Capability Development Plan strategy acts as the broad strategic 
tool and “driver” for R&T investments and cooperation by identifying and 
assessing capabilities and trends within the industry.179 The European Defence 
Research and Technology strategy builds off of the Capability Development Plan 
in aiming to enhance more effective R&T. Similarly, the European Armaments 
Cooperation strategy builds off of the Capability Development Plan in order to 
enhance more effective armaments cooperation in support of CSDP capability 
needs.180 
The second strategy is the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy, which aims to create a defence industrial 
landscape that is capability-driven, competent, and competitive in order to best 
serve the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). The EDTIB applies to 
the four core sectors of the defence economy, namely Aerospace, Land 
equipment, Naval, and Defence electronics. The EDTIB strives to be more 
integrated, less duplicative, and more interdependent, with increased 
specialisation. It does this through clarifying priorities, consolidating demand, 
increasing investments, ensuring Security of Supply, and increasing cooperation 
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and competition.181 This strategy is particularly relevant as it relates to those 
actions for which governments are responsible.  
 
The EDTIB develops by responding to a variety of external factors 
including political, economic, social, and technological factors. Bekkers notes that 
the EDEM, like all other markets, has a demand side, a supply side, and a 
regulator. However the EDEM is unique in that on the demand side the “buyer 
and end use of the products are not the same (governments and armed forces, 
respectively) and secondly that there is basically only one type of buyer, namely 
the government.”182 Nevertheless, the EDTIB is shaped by other factors, 
including European policy, national policy, the economy, technology, and society. 
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 This is fascinating in the context of the refugee crisis, as the emergence of 
a new ‘threat’ created an opportunity for firms to reshape the EDTIB such that it 
is flexible enough to provide new technologies, or modify existing technologies 
and products, so that they are capable of filling the new demand.  
 Finally, the EDTIB and the EDA would not be possible without the 
European Security Research Policy. Initiatives to create a fund available to 
defence companies for R&D purposes began in a Commission communication in 
March 2003 titled “Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy.”183 Under the 
seven year EU Framework Research Program (FP7, 2007-2013), €1.4 billion was 
allocated in order to “enhance public safety through the development of security 
technologies, and [foster] the growth of a globally competitive European 
‘Homeland Security’ market.”184 The research program under FP7 was soon 
changed to the Secure Societies Challenge under the Horizon 2020 Framework, 
with €1.7 billion in funding.185   
The primary aims of the Secure Societies Challenge are to enhance 
resilience against disasters, fight crime and terrorism, enhance cyber security, and 
to improve border security. Efforts to improve border security range from 
“improved maritime border protection, to supply chain security and support [of] 
the Union’s external security policies, including through conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding.”186 According to the European Commission, “The protection of 
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the European borders requires the development of systems, equipment, tools, 
processes, and methods for rapid identification. This includes supply chain 
security in the context of the EU’s customs policy. Furthermore, solutions will be 
developed to support the Union's external security policies in civilian tasks, 
ranging from civil protection to humanitarian relief, border management or 
peacekeeping and post-crisis stabilisation, including conflict prevention, 
peacebuilding and mediation.”187 
Key Players in the EU Defence Lobby 
The defence industry, like most other large special interests, has invested 
considerable time and resources into lobbying and advocating for their interests at 
the governmental level. In many cases, they have been successful. Researchers 
like Ben Hayes have already identified how the development of the ESRP was the 
brainchild of the Group of Personalities, a 25-member advisory body of whom 
eight had direct roots in major arms-producing companies: BAE Systems, Diehl, 
EADS, Ericsson, Finmeccanica (now Leonardo), Indra, Siemens, and Thales. 
Incidentally, it is these same companies who tend to be the major beneficiaries of 
R&D funding, and provides a clear example of corporate influence creating 
favourable policy outcomes.188 
When discussing the defence lobby, it is important to recognise that there 
are multiple avenues and forms the industry can take to influence policy, whether 
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it is government policy, EU policy, or specifically defence policy at either level. 
Beckley distinguishes four groups of actors within military lobbies; industrial 
sectors/associations, delegations of sector companies, expert groups, and think 
tanks.189 Each of these will be discussed with reference to key players in each 
category in order to set the stage for further investigation into the role these 
organisations or companies have played in shaping the EU’s response to the 
refugee crisis. 
Industrial Associations 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the shift of competencies to the European level 
in the 1990s led to an unprecedented boom in corporate lobbying at the EU level. 
However as companies quickly began to realise there was a limited number of 
seats at the table, they recognised the importance of creating trade federations and 
industrial groupings.190 These industry groupings worked together to create 
credible “policy profiles” that sought consolidate transnational industry interests 
in an attempt to cut the red tape and eliminate barriers across the EU on behalf of 
their member companies.  
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On the Transparency register, there are several associations that aim to 
promote further 
development of the 
defence and 
armaments sector, 
ranging from sports 
weapons to the 
aeronautical sector. 
The two most well-
known and influential 
of these associations, 
and the two most 
relevant for the 
purposes of this 
thesis, are the 
AeroSpace and 
Defence Industries 
Association of Europe (ASD), and the European Organization for Security (EOS). 
The AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) 
was founded in 2004 as the merger of three organisations191 that had been formed 
previously for the purposes of social and informational contacts, interest 
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advocacy, and position/advisory consolidation of the industry.192 In line with its 
roots, ASD’s overall mission today is “to be a central intelligence hub for 
Aerospace, Defence and Security Industries, where in anticipation of  their needs, 
ASD contributes to shape EU legislation and policies as well as securing funding 
opportunities by advocating common positions towards European Institutions and 
International organisations for the benefit of European industries and in the 
collective interest of its members.”193  
The organisation consists of 16 European Aerospace and Defence 
Companies and 26 National Associations in 19 countries. The organisation has 
two Statutory Bodies. The General Assembly (comprised of all members of ASD) 
is the supreme decision making body of the association, and determines the 
overall strategy and policies of the Association. The second body is the Board, 
composed of the CEOs, Chairmen of Company, and National Members, and is 
responsible for management of the Association.194  
ASD has six Commissions (ELT, R&T, Environment, Services, Supply 
Chain & SMEs and External Affairs) that address cross-functional areas. 
Specifically, “The objective of the ASD Business Units and Commissions is to 
identify policy issues to be pursued at European and Member State level and to 
propose strategies to maximise the benefits for the ASD industry.”195 These 
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commissions are supported by several committees and working groups, who 
discuss topics in detail, draft position papers, and issue recommendations.196 
Regarding lobbying, on the transparency register ASD estimates €298,000 
in annual costs related to activities covered by the register. 5 members of ASD are 
authorised to engage in dialogue with the EU institutions on its behalf, and 
another 5 are accredited for access to European Parliament, but can only follow 
the proceedings in Parliament as observers. Since November 2014, there have 
been 25 logged meetings between ASD and commissioners, their cabinet 
members, or directors-generals at the Commission.197 ASD does not participate in 
high-level groups, expert groups, or consultative committees in the European 
Commission or in industry forums in European Parliament. It does, however, 
participate in the Sky & Space Intergroup.198  
The second major industry association is the European Organisation for 
Security (EOS), currently headed by Luigi Rebuffi. EOS was created in 2007 by 
European private sector security companies, and their mission, similar to that of 
ASD, is “to provide a platform of collaborative work, insightful exchange of 
ideas, and best practices between the European Institutions and European security 
industry, research centres, universities local clusters and associations.”199 EOS’ 
main objective is the “development of a harmonised European security market in 
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line with political, societal and economic needs through the efficient use of 
budgets.”200 EOS has 45 members from 12 European countries, from giants in the 
field like BAE Systems, Thales, and Airbus, as well as smaller enterprises. 
EOS focuses its efforts on five policy areas: cyber security, border control, 
transport security, civil protection, and urban security. There are two sub-
Working Groups for border control: The Working Group on Border Surveillance 
and the Working Group on Smart Borders. “The latter deals with checks carried 
out at border crossing points (border checks), while the former extends to the 
surveillance of borders between border crossing points (border surveillance).”201 
EOS has estimated annual costs related to activities covered by the register 
to be €200,000 - €299,999, and 8 registered lobbyists. Furthermore, they have 
received €558,962 in grants from EU institutions under FP7. They do not 
participate in intergroups or industry forums in the Parliament, nor do they 
participate in high-level groups or consultative committees in the Commission. 
They do, however, participate in three expert groups in the Commission: 
Protection and Security Advisory Group (PASAG), Stakeholders’ Advisory 
Group on Aviation Security (SAGAS), and the Stakeholders’ Advisory Group on 
Land Transport Security (LANDSEC).  
                                                 
200 “What is EOS?” European Organisation for Security. 
201 “Border Control, EOS Initiative: Integrated Border Security Flagship.” European Organisation 
for Security. 2015. Web. Accessed 21 April 2017.   
 96 
 
Delegations of Sector Companies 
Industry associations are good ways to aggregate industry interests and use 
collective bargaining power to punch above one’s weight. However, many 
companies choose to participate in industry associations in conjunction with their 
own individual lobbying activities.  
Most major European defence companies maintain their own lobbying 
offices in Brussels, like BAE Systems, Safran, and Thales. The four largest 
defence companies in Europe are BAE Systems, Airbus Group, Leonardo 
(formerly Finmeccanica, the company was rebranded in 2016 following 
corruption allegations), and Thales (collectively known as the big four).  
Expert Groups 
The most direct way in which the defence lobby attempts to influence 
policy is through participation in expert groups. Expert groups convene when the 
Commission needs specialist advice from outside experts as a basis for 
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policymaking. They are consultative bodies set up by the Commission to provide 
advice in relation to the preparation of legislative acts and policy initiatives, and 
are usually appointed by EU governments.  
Members of expert groups may be individuals appointed in a personal 
capacity (Type A), individuals appointed to represent a common interest (Type 
B), organisations (Type C), Member States’ authorities (Type D), or other public 
entities like other EU bodies, offices, or agencies (Type E). Members of the 
defence industry would typically fall under Type B or C, however there are those 
who participate “in an individual capacity” following the declaration of a conflict 
of interest form, who are former members of the defence industry.202  
Regarding defence, there are a variety of groups the defence industry 
participates in, including the European Security Research Advisory Group 
(ESRAB), LeaderSHIP 2015–LeaderSHIP 2020, Protection and Security 
Advisory Group (PASAG), Stakeholders’ Advisory Group on Aviation Security 
(SAGAS), the Stakeholders’ Advisory Group on Land Transport Security 
(LANDSEC), the expert group on external border management, and the expert 
group on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).  
Think Tanks 
The final way in which the industry attempts to influence policy is through 
think tanks. Companies or associations will often commission or request reports 
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from various think tanks (typically ones they believe will be sympathetic to their 
agenda).203 Two prominent ones are the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) and 
the Kangaroo Group. SDA is a Brussels-based security and defence think tank 
that hosted thematic debates, international conferences, and issued a range of 
publications on relevant policies. SDA was mostly incorporated into the think 
tank Friends of Europe in October 2014, though it continues to be an important 
forum for debate and discussion for many high profile representatives from the 
private sector, NATO, the EU, and various other personalities.204 
The Kangaroo Group is an association of members of the European 
Parliament, Commission and Council and representatives of industry and 
academia working to enhance European unity step by step around the pursuit of 
common projects. Members of the defence industry include Safran, Airbus, Saab, 
and MBDA, and had declared lobbying costs of  €200,000 -  €299,999 for 2013 to 
2014.205 The motto of the Kangaroo Group is free movement and security, and it 
heavily emphasises the development of the CSDP.206 As Malte Luehmann of 
Corporate Europe Observatory notes, the arms and defence industry uses the 
Kangaroo Group as one of its lobbying channels to shape EU security and defence 
policies via their working group on “Space, Defence, and Security.” Luehmann 
further argues that Kangaroo Group members have unfair privileged access to 
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Parliament and MEPs due to their membership in the group, and this puts 
legislative transparency at risk. 
Lobby Category Registered Companies/Organisations 
Industry Associations - AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 
(ASD) 
- European Organization for Security (EOS) 
- Association des Fabricants Européens of Munitions of Sport 
(AFEMS) 
- Verband der Hersteller von Jagd-, Sportwaffen und Munition 
(JSM) 
- Portuguese Platform for Defence Industries (IDD) 
- Business Bridge Europe 
- European Organization of Military Associations 
- Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis 
- Association of European Research Establishments in 
Aeronautics (REIA) 
- Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aerospatiales 
- Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) 
Delegations of Sector 
Companies 
- BAE Systems 
- Airbus Group (EADS) 
- Finmeccanica 
- JJ tactical LLP-Military Weapon Systems 
- Saab AB 
- Thales 
- DCNS 
- MBDA 
- Fokker Technologies 
- Indra 
- Rolls-Royce 
- Selex 
- Telespazio 
- Safran, ThyssenKrupp, Fincantieri, Diehl, Aernnova, 
Frequentis, JC Brennan Consultancy, CNH Industrial, Siemens 
AG, and Avio Aero-GE Avio 
Expert Groups - ESRAB 
- PASAG 
- SAGAS 
- LANDSEC 
- Expert Group on GAMM 
- Expert Group on External Border Management 
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Think Tanks - Security and Defence Agenda 
- Kangaroo Group 
- Friends of Europe 
 
The Industry and the Crisis 
The uptick in defence spending (and by extension profits of the defence 
industry) resulting from European states’ desires to secure their borders from the 
refugee crisis is a part of a larger, perverse phenomenon. The majority of refugees 
arriving in Europe come from the Middle East or North Africa, regions with high 
and increasing incidences of war, chaos, violence, repression, human rights 
abuses, and poverty. Although the causes are complex, it is undoubtable that the 
widespread availability of arms fuels and facilitates the continuation of these 
atrocities. As Mark Akkerman notes, “countries in the Middle East belong to the 
largest arms purchasers in the world. Next to the USA, the countries that make up 
the European Union are the most important suppliers of these arms.”207 
Between 2005 and 2014, EU members granted €82 billion worth of arms 
exports licenses to the Middle East and North Africa -- even with partial arms 
embargoes installed by the UN and/or the EU against Egypt, Libya, Iran, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.208 Despite the use of arms to inhumanely 
crush popular uprisings during the Arab Spring, to enable the wars in Syria and 
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Yemen, and to facilitate the severe human rights 
abuses in Egypt, Israel,  Libya, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia, arms and defence exports to the region 
continue.  
Furthermore, research by Amnesty 
International showed that the majority of ISIS’ 
weapons come from capturing and illicitly buying 
from Iraqi stockpiles. ISIS is not unique in this regard 
-- most weapons used by insurgencies, militias, and 
terrorist organisations initially entered the country 
through  legal channels.209 Dispersion of weapons, 
particularly hard to track small arms, is a recurrent 
problem at the end of conflicts, and one that, when not 
adequately addressed, perpetuates violence and unrest.  
Clearly, European defence companies profit 
off of the instability and violence of the Middle East 
through arms exports. Perversely, the same companies 
who played a role in creating and fuelling the refugee 
crisis then profit off of Europe’s increasingly 
militarised, privatised, centralised, and externalised 
response to those same refugees. 
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SECTION 2:   
Border Policies and the Defence Industry 
This section takes the context and background provided by the history of 
the refugee crisis, information on the European border regime, and the European 
defence industry and lobby to examine how the defence industry benefits from 
and has attempted to shape trends in Europe’s border policy, and what the 
implications of this are for refugees. Much of this analysis will occur through the 
lens of multi-level governance, with special attention paid to ways in which the 
porosity and diffusion of competencies present in the EU may or may not have 
enabled domestic special interests to shape international policy.   
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6 
Trending to Profit: Industry, Lobby, and 
Profit 
The conclusions issued by the Council are key indicators of attitudes and 
priorities amongst EU members at any given time. The presence or absence of an 
issue, as well as the recommendations given to the European Commission for 
proposals to address a particular challenge or opportunity, provide a gauge for 
mainstream perspectives and opinions. 
The conclusions issued by the European Council pre-crisis contained 
themes and trajectories that remained largely unchanged once the crisis hit its 
peak (although the pace at which the recommendations were implemented 
accelerated). Major themes included:210 
● Support for relocation/resettlement schemes,  
● Support for return/readmission/reintegration schemes,  
● Calls for increased cooperation with third countries (of origin and 
transit),  
● Calls to uphold and protect Schengen principles,  
● Support for CEAS and EASO,  
● Support for a reinforced and strengthened CSDP,  
● Calls for increased military or Frontex operations in the 
Mediterranean and on land borders, as well as use of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams,  
● Increased border surveillance, 
● Tougher stances on combatting smuggling networks, and  
● Calls for the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard 
(EBCG).  
 
                                                 
210 This section comes from Chapter 4, the discussion on the European Council conclusions.  
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 These themes and recommendations are indicative of the route the EU 
chose to take in response to the refugee crisis. The route is one that can be 
characterised as leading to the increasing externalisation, militarisation, 
privatisation, and centralisation of European border policy. Nevertheless, the 
European Council conclusions simply influence and guide EU policy -- they do 
not set it. In order to examine whether the trends present in the European Council 
conclusions mirror the facts on the ground, we must look to the legislation 
adopted by the EU and its Member States.  
 These trends, and the legislation that embodies them, are united by another 
common thread -- the major beneficiaries of these trends are defence companies. 
This section seeks to explore how the trends towards the externalisation, 
militarisation, privatisation, and centralisation of border control identified in the 
rhetoric of the European Council conclusions have manifested themselves in 
policy, particularly through the European Agenda on Migration (EAM).211  
Each subsequent section that unpacks the trends will follow a similar 
formula. I will begin by defining the trend and briefly placing it in a greater 
historical context. Next, I will examine EU or domestic policies that embody that 
trend (with special attention paid to the EAM). I will then point out the ways in 
which the defence industry profits either directly or indirectly off of these trends, 
and I will identify any connections that can be drawn between the defence 
                                                 
211 The EAM divides itself into “immediate steps” and “four pillars to manage migration better,” 
namely reducing the incentives for irregular migration, border management, a strong common 
asylum policy, and a new policy on legal migration. 
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industry/their lobbyists212 and the EU. Finally, each section will conclude with 
what the implications of these policies are for refugees.  
In order to identify links between industry/lobbyists and the government, 
several tactics were employed. I began by identifying the key policies or actions 
that the defence industry has profited off of, particularly as they relate to issues of 
migration, border security, refugees, and Horizon 2020. I then tracked the creation 
of that legislation and its support in order to determine key supporters. Naturally, 
the most relevant DG for these purposes was that of Migration and Home Affairs, 
led by Director-General Matthias Ruete. Next, I compiled a list of any contacts 
that occurred between the relevant government officials and members of the 
defence industry, or their representatives through using the EU Transparency 
Register. I then searched for documents or press releases from these meetings, and 
in some cases submitted Freedom of Information requests for unpublished 
documents or memos. Finally, I compared these documents, relevant statements 
from the lobby or company itself (typically in the form of position papers or 
recommendations), and the final form of the policy itself in order to identify 
similarities in concepts or phrasing. For example, here is the compiled list of all 
the contacts Director-General Matthias Ruete had with the defence industry 
regarding issues of migration, border security, refugees, Horizon 2020, and other 
relevant legislation:  
                                                 
212 For a full list of contacts between DG Migration and Home Affairs, and Director General 
Matthias Ruete, see appendix.  
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Date Location Entity/ies met Subject(s) 
13/02/2017 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Airbus Group N.V Discussion on the security 
research implications of the 
European Defence Action Plan 
22/09/2016 Brussels, 
Belgium 
European 
Organisation for 
Security (EOS)  
Role of the Private Sector in the 
next steps of the European 
Agendas on Migration and 
Security, including possible 
public-private partnerships. 
05/07/2016 Brussels, 
Belgium 
KPMG EMA 
(KPMG EMA)  
Migration Policy 
27/04/2016 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Airbus Group 
N.V.  
Appraisal of H2020 MTR, 
Border & Coastguard System, 
Executive Agency Coordination 
19/04/2016 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Freshfields 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer LLP   
Informal Lunch Discussion on 
Migration and Asylum Policy 
05/11/2015 Brussels, 
Belgium 
AeroSpace and 
Defence Industries 
Association of 
Europe (ASD)  
EU Industry's Role in the 
Migration Crisis 
09/10/2015 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Rheinmetall 
Group  
Migration, Border Security 
23/04/2015 Brussels, 
Belgium 
European 
Organisation for 
Security (EOS)  
Discussion on Issues related to 
Security Industry 
Competitiveness in the H2020 
"Secure Societies" Programme 
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10/03/2015 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Airbus Group 
N.V.  
H2020 Sécurité - Généralisation 
des clauses IPRs pour les PCPs 
23/01/2015 Brussels, 
Belgium 
AeroSpace and 
Defence Industries 
Association of 
Europe (ASD)  
Exchange of views on Security 
Industrial issues, The European 
Agenda on Security and 
Proposals for flagship 
programmes in Cybersecurity 
and Border Management 
19/12/2014 Brussels, 
Belgium 
European 
Organisation for 
Security (EOS)  
Update on Security Flagships 
(Cybersecurity and Integrated 
Border Management)  
 In some cases, this yielded quite fruitful results. For example, on 
5/11/2015 Ruete met with Burkard Schmitt, a former EU official who now works 
for ASD, and Alberto de Benedictus, a former manager of Leonardo and 
Chairman of ASD’s “Security Business Unit.” According to the Transparency 
Register, they were set to discuss “EU Industry’s Role in the Migration Crisis.” 
Yet documents revealed that the trio had discussed a research programme called 
“Security for Europe and its Citizens,” and a memo written ahead of the meeting 
for EU officials stated that ASD “had actively taken part in discussions to shape 
our strategic documents [...] In particular, he managed to convince ASD members 
to negotiate ‘special modalities’ for security research projects to better share 
results across frontiers within the EU.”213 (emphasis mine)  
                                                 
213 European Union. “Meeting with ASD.” Response to Ask the EU request by Dimitri Tokmetzis. 
10 June 2016. Ref. Ares(2016)3065318 - 29/06/2016.  
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In other cases, however, access to documents was limited or their content 
was redacted -- for example, EOS’s legislative proposal was redacted on the 
grounds that were the information to be disclosed it would “seriously undermine 
the Commission’s ongoing decision-making process.”214 Further issues arose in 
circumstances like Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP’s meeting on 19/04/2016, 
which was described as an “informal lunch discussion on Migration and Asylum 
policy.” Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP is an international law firm with 
clients around the world. It was unclear who they were representing, nor what was 
discussed since the lunch was, indeed, “informal.” 
In all circumstances, it is nearly impossible to quantify the influence or 
effect a certain company or organisation had in shaping a policy. Nevertheless, 
the smoking guns are there, as are the trends that lead to increased profit for those 
very same companies. 
Centralisation 
The first trend is the centralisation, sometimes called institutionalisation, 
of border management and border enforcement processes. This refers to the 
shifting of competences and decision-making away from Member States and into 
the hands of the EU. This trend is perhaps the most significant from a governance 
and international relations perspective, because it involves the surrender of 
sovereign power in the form of border control. This is perhaps one of the most 
                                                 
214 European Union. “Your Application for Access to Documents.”  Response to Ask the EU 
request by Dimitri Tokmetzis. 26 July 2016.  
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radical departures from traditional Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty, 
particularly given the weight and importance attached to the power to manage 
who and what comes into and out of a state’s territory.  
This devolution of power began with the Schengen Agreement in 1985, 
long before the refugee crisis.215 Member states soon recognised the 
disproportionate responsibility borne by Schengen states with external borders, 
and so, on 26 October 2004 a Council Regulation established the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union, or Frontex.216  
According to the Council Regulation, Frontex’s main tasks were: 
coordinating cooperation between member states in external border management, 
assisting member states in training of national border guards, carrying out risk 
analyses, following research relevant for the control and surveillance of external 
borders, helping member states who require technical and operational assistance 
at external borders, and providing member states with the necessary support in 
organising joint return operations.217  
The limitations of Frontex soon became apparent as the refugee crisis 
escalated. Many believe Frontex to be “an overarching institution exercising 
                                                 
215 For more information about the Schengen Agreement and what followed, refer to Chapter 4. 
216 Frontex was established by Council of Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, and began work on 3 
October 2005.   
217 European Union. "Council Regulation establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union." 
European Council. No 2007/2004. 26 October 2004. 
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supranational powers,”218 however, in reality, Frontex is simply a coordinating 
agency. At the outset of the crisis, it did not have the power to own heavy assets, 
and depended upon the personnel and physical and financial support of Member 
States. Even as EU leaders agreed to increase its budget by 26.8 million euros in 
April 2015, Frontex found that without sufficient provision of equipment and 
border guards the funds were essentially useless.219  
The refugee crisis shone a spotlight on the shortcomings of Frontex. 
Perhaps more importantly, it exposed the tension that existed between the 
normative and ideological desire for a “borderless Europe” based on principles of 
free movement among member states, and the lack of a practical means by which 
to ensure these principles. The principles of free movement embodied in the 
Schengen Agreement had been informal law since 1985, and a part of EU law 
since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. By the time the refugee crisis struck, it 
appeared that there was still debate over how much faith and importance to place 
on upholding those norms, as demonstrated through Member States’ 
reintroduction of temporary internal border controls. States also seemed to 
recognize that it would be difficult to uphold Schengen without a strong, 
centralised, and fairly autonomous agency. 
                                                 
218 Mathiason, Nick. “Frontex Resource Limitations put Agency in Straitjacket.” EU Observer. 15 
September 2015. Accessed 7 April 2017. https://euobserver.com/investigations/130281 
219 Mathiason, Nick. “Frontex Resource Limitations put Agency in Straitjacket.” 
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European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) 
It was in this context that, on 14 September 2016, the European Border 
and Coast Guard (EBCG)220 was born. Regulation 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and Council essentially upgraded Frontex, providing it with “the 
additional competences needed for it to effectively implement integrated border 
management at Union level (…) and overcome the discrepancies that still remain 
at the national level.”221 There are the three new functions that have drawn the 
most attention. 
First, the EBCG has been granted a “supervisory role” over Member 
States and their external border management techniques and capabilities. This is 
intended to ensure common integrated management, and as such the EBCG has 
the authority to recommend the adoption of specific measures, and the 
management board has the capability to adopt binding decisions that Member’s 
must implement.222  
Second, the EBCG was granted greater technical and operational 
competencies -- it now has the power to purchase/own its own equipment, and 
will have at least 1,500 border guards at its immediate disposal.223 
                                                 
220 It should be noted that the EBCG still goes by Frontex. For the purposes of this section, 
however, I will use “EBCG” instead of Frontex in order to maintain clarity whilst differentiating 
between the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders (2005 - 2016), and the EBCG.  
221 European Union. "Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European 
Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. (Hereinafter EBCG Regulation 2016/1624)" 
European Commission. Strasbourg. 15 December 2015. 
222 European Union. “EBCG Regulation 2016/1624.” Article 13(8).  
223 European Union. “EBCG Regulation 2016/1624.” Article 18(2). 
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Finally, “The new agency is empowered to monitor the effective 
functioning of the external borders of the Member States, carry out vulnerability 
assessments, verify whether a Member State is able to effectively enforce EU law 
and detect deficiencies in the management of its borders. If a Member State either 
fails to take the measures recommended in its vulnerability assessment or does not 
take the necessary action in the face of disproportionate migratory pressure, the 
EBCG shall adopt a unified and effective EU approach, since the functioning of 
the Schengen area might otherwise be jeopardized.”224 This competence, often 
referred to as the EBCG’s “intervention capacity,” is perhaps the most 
contentious. There is some disagreement as to whether the EBCG’s intervention 
capacity is the next largest step in European integration since the establishment of 
a common currency, or whether they actually have several institutional and 
procedural restraints that temper their power.  
Regardless of the implications of the EBCG in terms of European 
integration, particularly through the lens of multi-level governance, it is 
undeniable that its new powers present a prime opportunity for the defence 
industry for several reasons. Firstly, and most obviously, the EBCG now has the 
capability to buy and co-own equipment, which opens the door to a new market 
for the defence industry. Though this may seem unimportant given the EBCG’s 
relatively low budget, its significance is amplified when coupled with its 
“supervisory role.” The EBCG’s vulnerability assessments means the EBCG has 
                                                 
224 Fernandez Rojo, David. "The European Border and Coast Guard: Towards the Centralization 
of the External Border Management?" Academic Research Network on Agencification of EU 
Executive Governance (TARN). 7 February 2017. Accessed 8 April 2017.  
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the power to recommend (in some cases bindingly) the adoption of certain 
measures.225 
The defence industry seems to have been well aware of this potential long 
before the general public was. In September 2010, EOS proposed the creation of 
“an EU level Border Guards capability able of supporting Member State 
interventions, providing resources in case of crisis with a capability for basin-
wide monitoring, directly operated by Frontex and using, where appropriate, 
aerial visualisation.”226 EOS also released a recommendation in May 2010 that 
called for “interoperability and information sharing across countries and 
stakeholders of different sectors,” something that is reflected in the EBCG’s 
suggestion that the agency “strengthen its cooperation with the European 
Fisheries Control Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, and national 
authorities carrying out coast guard functions.”227 
Finally, the defence industry serves to benefit from increased cooperation 
with the agency due to its increased involvement in research and innovation. The 
agency “assists the member states and the European Commission in identifying 
key border security technologies and draws up and implements the EU framework 
programmes for research and innovation activities in the border security area.”228 
As discussed in the “privatisation” trend section, the defence industry has much to 
                                                 
225 I was unable to find specific examples of this -- it may be that they are not made public, or that 
due to the youth of the EBCG they have not yet occurred. 
226 Akkerman, Mark. “Border Wars.” (20) 
227 Ibid.  
228 European Border and Coast Guard Agency. “What is New?” Frontex Pressroom. 10 November 
2016. Accessed 7 April 2016.  
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gain from access to R&D grants. It would certainly seem that one way in which 
the industry could gain a competitive advantage in securing R&D funds would be 
through a multi-pronged approach in which one target is the EBCG.  
Let us take this hypothetical example: A certain defence company has 
begun to develop a new technology or machinery that has the potential to increase 
the efficacy or efficiency of border control techniques. This alone may likely be 
sufficient to enable them access to R&D grant money to further their research. 
However, if that company can convince or demonstrate to the EBCG their utility 
and potential, the EBCG may be inclined to advocate on behalf of said company 
in their new capacity as end-user consultants to the research programmes. This 
scenario is entirely speculative. Since the organisation is so young, there is limited 
available information regarding the EBCG’s procurement or research activities at 
this time. However, in 2014 and 2015, at least seven coordinated meetings 
between Frontex and industry took place, so there is communication occurring. 
Nevertheless, this hypothesis is included as a potential avenue through which the 
defence industry can entrench their position. Time will attest to its validity. 
The defence industry is well aware of this hypothetical, and in the past 
years Frontex (and now the EBCG) has frequently been contacted by industry 
representatives with all kinds of proposals. These mostly “focus on offering 
surveillance and/or detection equipment.”229 Nevertheless, it should also be noted 
that Frontex/EBCG tends to deny requests to participate in EU-funded R&D 
                                                 
229 Akkerman, Mark. “Border Wars.” (22) 
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projects because it “is sometimes part in the evaluation committee as evaluators of 
the European funded project proposals.”230 
As for equipment, Northrop Grumman and Leonardo contributed “the 
operational control centre ground station, two transportable ground stations and 
communications technology for the transmission of data and imagery between the 
remotely piloted aircraft and the ground segment and mission support 
facilities.”231 Nevertheless, Frontex/EBCG has declined most requests for 
meetings, instead diverting potential supplier’s to its biannual industry days and 
workshops for industry and academia.232 Most of these meetings involve 
showcases of the newest technology and equipment, demonstrating once more the 
supply-driven market of border security. 
Implications 
Just as there are implications for traditional conceptions of sovereign 
authority, centralisation has several hazards and benefits for the safety and 
security of refugees. The centralisation of external border management could 
encourage closer cooperation with the CEAS and EASO. This in turn has the 
potential to lead to more standardised procedures for registering, relocating, and 
receiving migrants, thus minimising cross border redundancies. Furthermore, the 
EBCG includes a new administrative complaint mechanism through which 
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fundamental rights violations that have occurred in the course of activities carried 
out by the EBCG can be redressed.233  
On the other hand, there are concerns that the lack of democratic 
accountability within the EBCG, coupled with the capacity to intervene, will lead 
to a lack of oversight in human rights abuses and other questionable practices. 
Avon rightly notices a link between the right to intervene and concern over 
respect for human rights: “on the one hand the right to intervene is criticized by 
right-wing oriented countries like Poland and Hungary for the reluctance of 
giving EU too much of their sovereignty on border issues, on the other hand it is 
being questioned by left-wing oriented parts because of the vacuum of 
responsibility concerning human rights protections during the Agency's 
activities.”234 
Finally, the development of the EBCG is closely related to the next trend, 
militarisation. Before the EBCG, the defence industry did not directly profit off of 
Frontex operations, since the equipment was owned by Member States who then 
contributed their use to Frontex. Nevertheless, the equipment’s use led to 
increased obsolescence, requiring upgrades and new purchases to fulfil 
obligations to Frontex that will line the pockets of the defence industry. The 
ability to purchase equipment and maintain a standing border guard force 
                                                 
233 Avon, Maddalena. "European Border and Coast Guard Authority: Another brick in Fortress 
Europe." Centar Za Mirovne Studije. 3 July 2017. Accessed 8 April 2016.  
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facilitated the execution of EBCG operations in the Mediterranean, one factor that 
contributed to the militarisation of European border control. 
Militarisation 
Militarisation is defined as the process by which a society organises itself 
for military conflict and violence.235 It refers not only to the strategic placement 
of troops and military installations in a given territory, “but also a re-conception 
of that territory in purely military terms, that is a territory to be secured against an 
enemy threat.”236 When discussing border militarisation, it is in reference to the 
“systematic intensification of the border's security apparatus, transforming the 
area from a transnational frontier to a zone of permanent vigilance, enforcement, 
and violence.”237 In such a conception, the border becomes an imagined war zone. 
Europe’s border militarisation tends to fall into two broad categories: the 
militarisation of physical borders, and the militarisation of responses to refugees.   
Militarisation of Borders 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the militarisation of physical 
borders are the walls and fences that have been erected, and the police, military, 
and paramilitary forces that guard them. As of March 2017, border fences had 
                                                 
235 Bond, Brian. War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970. McGill-Queen's University Press. 1985. 
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been constructed on the Turkish-Bulgarian border, the Turkish-Greek border, the 
Greek-Macedonian border, along Hungary’s border with Serbia and Croatia, and 
along pieces of Slovenia’s border with Croatia. In addition, smaller border fences 
have been built in Calais, France at the Eurotunnel, and at Ceuta and Melilla, 
Spain.  
Hungary’s wall is the most notorious. In June 2015, under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the Hungarian cabinet approved the construction 
of a 4-metre-tall barrier fence along the 175-kilometre-long border with Serbia. 
The fence is being built by a deployment of 900 soldiers at a grand total of $106 
million, built largely with prison labour.238 The high-tech fence is capable of 
delivering electric shocks, and is armed with heat sensors, cameras, and multi-
lingual loudspeakers. The fence contains two “transit zones,” or border posts, 
where Hungarian guards process just 10 people per day.239 In February 2017, the 
government announced it would begin construction of a second fence along the 
same 109-mile border with Serbia it has already fenced off. Despite the country’s 
high foreign and sovereign debt obligations accumulated under Orban, the interior 
ministry budget will be increased by $130.7 million in order to pay for the 123 
million euro new fence.240 
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Furthermore, several states opted to invoke Article 25, 26, 28, or 29 of the 
Schengen Borders Code, enabling them to introduce temporary border controls at 
internal borders. Under these articles, states are permitted to impose restrictions of 
movement for foreseeable events (such as sports events) (Article 25 and 26), 
cases requiring immediate action (Article 28), or in cases where exceptional 
circumstances put the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk (Article 
29).241 Since early 2015, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Malta, Sweden, 
France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and Poland have opted to enact 
temporary border control measures.242 
Of the states that opted to enact temporary border controls, several still 
remain in place: 
- France (27 January – 15 July 2017) 
- Germany (11 February 2017 – 11 May 2017) 
- Austria (11 February 2017 – 11 May 2017) 
- Denmark (11 February 2017 – 11 May 2017) 
- Sweden (11 February 2017 – 11 May 2017) 
- Norway (11 February 2017 – 11 May 2017) 
Militarisation of Responses to Refugees 
The second form militarisation takes is militarisation of responses to 
refugees. Not only did Hungary build a fence, they also employed soldiers and 
military personnel to guard the wall and conduct security screenings of migrants 
attempting to enter. In September 2015, there were 300 special Hungarian TEK 
paramilitary officials and 10,000 police officers in the area near the Serbian 
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border town of Horgos. If that wasn’t enough, the Hungarian police released a call 
for 3,000 more “border hunters,” who will reinforce existing police and military 
personnel. The recruits, like the soldiers, “will carry pistols with live ammunition, 
and have pepper spray, batons, handcuffs and protective kit.”243 This call was 
released at a time at which the number of migrants reaching Hungary’s southern 
border with Serbia stagnated at fewer than 200 per day.244 
A few weeks after this call was sent out, Hungarian riot police, followed 
by special TEK paramilitary troops, fired tear gas at refugees who broke through 
the fence. Officials used high pressure hoses, pepper spray, batons, and tear gas to 
beat back the crowds.245 Less than a week later, Hungary’s parliament passed a 
law allowing the army to use non-lethal force such as rubber bullets, 
pyrotechnical devices, tear gas grenades, and net guns against refugees in order to 
protect themselves against the ‘brutal threat’ posed by refugees.246 247  
Hungary is not alone in such actions. Macedonia, Austria, Croatia, the 
Netherlands, and the Czech Republic have all used armed forces and/or tear gas in 
an attempt to repel migrants. In May 2015, Bulgaria sent soldiers to its border 
with Macedonia, and in August sent more soldiers and light armoured vehicles to 
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support border police even though joint patrols weren’t expected. Slovenia called 
in the military and hired private security guards to patrol borders.248 
The use of military force to push back refugees at land borders is echoed 
by other states at sea. Italy was the first nation to conduct military operations in 
the sea aimed at addressing migration. The first operation, Mare Nostrum249, was 
a naval and air humanitarian operation aimed at search and rescue that ran from 
18 October 2013 to 31 October 2014 following the tragic death of 300 migrants 
off the coast of Lampedusa.250 The operation had a hefty budget of 11.3 million 
euros each month, with just 1.8 million euros of support provided by the External 
Borders Fund under the European Commission despite requests for more.251 By 
the time of its conclusion on 31 October 2014, Operation Mare Nostrum was 
estimated to have saved over 130,000 people.252 According to Interior Minister 
Angelino Alfano, Mare Nostrum shut down because it was “an emergency 
operation,” and because it quickly become too costly for a single nation to fund. 
Frontex soon replaced Mare Nostrum with Operation Triton on 1 November 2014, 
whose monthly budget is considerably smaller at about 3 million euros.253  
                                                 
248 Akkerman, Mark. “Border Wars.” (12) 
249  In "The Political 'Migration Crisis' and the Military-Humanitarian Response, " Pierluigi 
Musaro notes, “Mare Nostrum (our sea) was the Roman name for the Mediterranean Sea, hijacked 
by Mussolini to frame fascist propaganda about the ‘Italian lake’. As the same (ambivalent) name 
indicates, the possessive ‘our’ projects the Mediterranean as a European space of care and control, 
while it ambiguously refers to both Italy and Europe.”  
250 Taylor, Adam. "Italy ran an operation that saved thousands of migrants from drowning in the 
Mediterranean. Why did it stop?" The Washington Post. 20 April 2015. Accessed 6 April 2017.  
251 European Union. "Frontex Joint Operation 'Triton' - Concerted Efforts to manage migration in 
the Central Mediterranean." European Commission Press Release. Brussels. 7 October 2014. 
Accessed 6 April 2017.  
252 Taylor, Adam. "Italy ran an operation that saved thousands of migrants from drowning in the 
Mediterranean. Why did it stop?"  
253 Ibid. 
 122 
 
Operation Triton differed from Mare Nostrum in both scope and 
effectiveness for one key reason. Being a Frontex (i.e. pre-EBCG) operation, it 
was dependent on the voluntary contributions of 15 member states. As the crisis 
grew in scale and intensity, search and rescue operations at sea became more 
politically unfeasible as public opinion towards refugees and immigrants began to 
shift away from hospitality and towards xenophobia.254 Thus when Operation 
Mare Nostrum concluded, there was a public opinion driven push amongst 
member states to have Operation Triton focus on border protection rather than 
search and rescue, and to operate closer to the Italian coast as opposed to off the 
coast of Libya as well. Yet following the death of 1500 people in one week, EU 
heads of state held an emergency summit in which they agreed to triple the budget 
of Operation Triton to 120 million euros for 2015-2016, and the UK agreed to 
send HMS Bulwark, two naval patrol boats, and three helicopters to join.255    
In the Eastern Mediterranean, Frontex launched a similar operation. 
Operation Poseidon began in 2006 after Greece asked for surveillance of the 
country’s sea and land borders with Turkey. It was replaced by Poseidon Rapid 
Intervention in 2015. The deployment is expected to rise to 376 officers, 
interpreters, and experts in screening, debriefing, fingerprinting, and forged 
documents from various EU member states and Schengen Associated Countries. 
According to the Frontex website, the operation “will also put a greater emphasis 
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on security checks.”256 This marks one of the largest operations Frontex has 
executed yet.  
These operations entail the deployment of vessels, helicopters, drones, and 
submarines in addition to the utilization of surveillance technologies under 
EUROSUR. The stated goals are to disrupt criminal networks of smugglers and in 
doing so, prevent the loss of life at sea, yet this is not what the operations appear 
to achieve. 
It is important to note that these operations are reflective of infrastructure 
and policy that had been in place before the refugee crisis struck. These 
programmes had been designed many years before in the context of small, steady 
flows of people crossing primarily from Northern Africa into Italy, like those 
discussed in Chapter 3. In many ways, it was a natural response for states to ramp 
up existing migrant management infrastructure, like the Frontex operations, in 
response to what they perceived as an increase in flows that they were used to. 
Yet this crisis was different from previous flows of “irregular economic migrants” 
because those on the ships qualified for protection under international law. To the 
credit of European leaders, particularly in Italy, they appeared to recognise this 
nuance. The search and rescue nature of Operation Mare Nostrum is one indicator 
of this. The general public in many cases appeared to lose this nuance, which can 
likely be attributed to some news organisations’ tendencies to paint all migrants 
with a broad brush. Thus, the resulting pressure to move away from search and 
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rescue and towards border protection, in a return to pre-crisis norms in operations, 
created an unsafe situation for thousands of people.  
 
Implications 
An understanding of the EU’s perspective on smugglers provides an 
interesting framework through which the militarisation of Europe’s borders can be 
more easily understood. During much of the crisis, the rhetoric of politicians did 
two things. First, politicians (including Theresa May, Federica Mogherini, Yvette 
Cooper, and William Hague257) conflated the terms “smuggler” and “trafficker,” 
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effectively obfuscating the issue and blurring legal definitions. Although this may 
seem overly nuanced, the distinction between the two (like the distinction 
between ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’) is not simply a semantic one, but a political and 
legal one as well. There are key distinctions in terms of exploitation, consent, and 
borders, and these differences are crucial in shaping both responses and legal 
avenues for prosecution.  
Rhetorically equating “smuggler” and “trafficker” serves to reinforce the 
second tactic of politicians, namely the demonization of smugglers by placing the 
blame for the refugee crisis on them. Under such warped logic, the fault of the 
crisis lies not in the root causes of instability, war, and poverty, nor in the 
secondary cause of appalling conditions in neighbouring countries, nor even in the 
tertiary cause of the lack of legal avenues for immigration or asylum request 
procedures to get to Europe. Instead, Europe’s leaders project the responsibility of 
the crisis outwards onto the backs of those whom refugees perceive to be the last 
recourse to safety. Refugees have been forced to rely on smugglers largely 
because of the lack of legal means through which to claim asylum and reach 
Europe. Smugglers are the suppliers that respond to a demand that remains 
unimpeded by Europe’s attempts to dissuade migration by closing its doors. Thus, 
the EU responds by attacking one of the few actors left that facilitate refugees’ 
escape from war zones -- all in the name of protecting refugees.  
 This example is not intended to condone or absolve smugglers for their 
crimes -- indeed, there have been disturbingly many accounts of exploitation, 
sexual violence, and theft, and smugglers must be held accountable. Rather, the 
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rhetorical response to smugglers is indicative of a greater framework in which the 
act of migration is criminalised, and thus smugglers, as enablers of crime, are 
criminalised as well. Although many smugglers are indeed criminal, it is 
important to recognise their role as scapegoat in this crisis. They serve as a 
distraction from the EU and its Member States’ failures to create legal pathways 
for asylum seekers to enter Europe, and further use them as an excuse to 
militarise.  
When migration is seen as a threat to state security and stability 
(particularly when coupled with rhetoric of terrorists entering Europe as refugees 
in disguise), and smugglers are seen as exploitative criminals, a military response 
seems necessary. Refugees face themselves up against the formidable walls of 
militarised “Fortress Europe.”  
This puts the military (be it in the form of Frontex-coordinated operations 
or Member States acting alone) in an interesting position. Under Operation Mare 
Nostrum, their efforts were truly humanitarian, placing an emphasis and priority 
on saving lives. The rhetorical and social context in which the operation occurred 
placed the military in the position of humanitarian, and thus began to construct a 
narrative that placed the military as saviour and the smugglers as oppressor.  
Yet following the shift in priorities and approach that occurred under both 
Operation Triton and Poseidon Rapid Intervention created confusion about the 
military’s role, missions, and EU policies. Suddenly the military was no longer 
acting as saviour, yet the rhetoric was so entrenched that this is what they 
continued to be characterised as. It seemed that the saviour/oppressor narrative 
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had turned into an oppressor/oppressor narrative for refugees. As Musaro notes, 
“Rather than promoting solidarity in the name of human dignity, the military-
humanitarian narrative sustains a complex ontology of inequality that reproduces 
specific value hierarchies and evaluations of human life. As in other instances of 
humanitarian government, care and control both fuel and feed off each other, 
nurturing a ‘compassionate repression’ that fails to bridge the gap between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. On the contrary, this risks providing support to the neo-liberal global 
governance in establishing an asymmetric (in terms of both agency and dignity) 
moral geography of the world.”258  
Finally, this false narrative conceals the direct role these military 
operations have in contributing to the death toll. Human rights agencies (as well 
as refugees on boats steered by smugglers) have reported deaths and injuries at 
the hands of patrolmen on Frontex-led operations, which has in turn raised serious 
concerns about their use of firearms. “Frontex officers must abide by the same 
rules of engagement as police in the host country where they are operating.[...] 
According to the rules of engagement for Greek coast guard officers, as well as 
Frontex officers working in Greece, shooting to disable a vehicle is legal if it is 
done to prevent someone from illegally entering or exiting a country, if they have 
a firearm.”259 Frontex has acknowledged that these shootings have, in multiple 
cases, caused the injury and death of refugees aboard smuggler boats, yet Greek 
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courts often rule in favour of coast guard officers, arguing that they shot in order 
to stop a suspected smuggler and thus justified.260 
The complaint mechanism created under the EBCG attempts to provide a 
legal forum through which such accusations can be levelled in an attempt to gain 
both justice for the victims and accountability for the officers. Again, due to the 
youth of the EBCG, the efficacy of such complaint mechanisms remains to be 
seen. 
Privatisation 
The final trend is one that is used by states around the world for a variety 
of purposes -- privatisation. Privatisation “includes any measure that results in a 
temporary or permanent transfer to the private sector of activities that are 
normally associated with being a State function or where the nature of an activity 
is inherently public in that a public body or agency normally implements such 
tasks.”261 In the traditional sense of the word, privatisation implies that the state 
makes a full transfer of sovereign power and ownership of a resource, process, or 
function to a private actor.262 In the context of border control and management, 
this is somewhat murky since the state retains control over the policy and 
                                                 
260  The Intercept elected to publish documents they had acquired from Frontex that were meant to 
be redacted, but inadvertently were released in full, revealing multiple cases of firearms use 
against boats carrying refugees. They can be found at: https://theintercept.com/2016/08/22/coast-
guard-fired-at-migrant-boats-european-border-agency-documents-show/ 
261  Kritzman-Amir. T., “Privatization and Delegation of State Authority in Asylum Systems.”  
Law & Ethics of Human Rights Vol. 5(1) (2011). (200) 
262 Ibid. 
 129 
 
regulation. Privatisation in this case occurs as a vehicle or mode of policy 
implementation. 
The EAM does not contain specific language or provisions relating to the 
privatisation of border control or asylum processes. Rather, privatisation tends to 
occur at the state level. Decisions to privatise may be influenced by efficiency, 
cost reduction possibilities, access to specific information or other qualities, 
and/or political ideology.263 Privatisation tends to take two main forms: the use of 
private security firms to guard or manage migrant detention centres and/or 
funding for security research development programs.  
Privately Run Detention Centres 
As European states increase their border control operations through 
militaristic responses, many have found themselves stretched thin for resources. 
Lured by the promise of lower costs, many European states have turned to the use 
of private security companies to guard or manage migrant detention centres.  
Under EU law, there are three types of people who may be detained for 
the purpose of deportation: “foreign nationals present on EU territory without 
leave to remain in accordance with the Return Directive; foreign nationals at an 
EU border (land, airport or other), who do not meet the conditions for entry under 
the Schengen Borders Code; and in some cases, asylum seekers, while their 
application is being processed, in accordance with the Asylum Procedures 
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Directive.”264 Detention takes place in EU territory at various ad hoc buildings or 
structures, as well as in informal centres, local police stations, army barracks, or 
closed camps.265 Furthermore, detention is increasingly being encouraged to 
occur outside EU territory. In 2006,  EU-funded private detention centres opened 
in Mauritania, though they were eventually closed in 2010, due to reports of 
human rights abuses, criticism, and pressure from civil society.266 More are 
expected to open following the conclusion of the “Khartoum process,”267 
however, creating an intersection between trends of privatisation and 
externalisation.268  
The trend towards the privatisation of detention centres has been 
happening over past decades in varying forms and degrees. The UK was the first 
European country to outsource immigrant detention, and today the majority of 
migrant detention centres are managed by multinational security companies. 780 
million pounds have been allocated between 2004 and 2022 for the detention and 
deportation of migrants. Major beneficiaries include G4S, GEO Group, Mitie, 
Serco, and Tascor.269  
G4S, for example, won a contract worth 191.5 million pounds for the 
management of Brook House and Tinsley House Immigrant Removal Centres, 
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two centres which it continues to manage today. G4S also won the contract for 
Cedars Pre-Departure Accommodation Facility between 2011 and 2015, worth 25 
million pounds. Serco won a 70-million-pound contract to manage Yarl’s Wood 
Centre from 2014 to 2021. Mitie won the contract for joint management of 
Colnbrook IRC and Harmondsworth IRC for a total of 173 million pounds from 
2014 - 2022. GEO Group managed the Dungavel detention centre under a 40 
million pound contract for 2011 - 2016.270 The aforementioned figures are for the 
UK alone. When considering the replication of similar models of privatised 
detention centres (particularly in Italy, France, Greece, Spain, and Sweden), the 
trend magnifies, and not without cost.  
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Behind many of these private security companies are bigger, more 
powerful stakeholders including international financial actors like banks, 
investment firms, hedge funds, and stockholders who provide and circulate the 
capital that underpins the privatisation of border controls. Martin Lemberg-
Pederson succinctly draws these connections through the example of 
Finmeccanica (now Leonardo):  
“National authorities and international banks such as JP Morgan and 
Goldman Sachs own stocks in the defence company, and in 2009 the European 
Commission and the European Investment Bank granted a Finmeccanica 
subsidiary a joint €500m loan for the production of aeronautical components also 
used in border control aircraft. Meanwhile, national export credit agencies have 
used taxpayers’ money to provide guarantees for PSMCs exporting control 
equipment to Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East―and the 
international banking sector is also instrumental for these processes. In 2010, 24 
credit institutions, coordinated by BNP Paribas and including actors such as the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank of America, Unicredit, Barclays, Citigroup, HSBC, 
JP Morgan, and Goldman Sachs, guaranteed Finmeccanica a five-year revolving 
credit line worth €2.4bn. Through such stock purchases, loans, and credit lines, 
major financial actors are essential supporters for the industry reconfiguring 
European borders today.”271 
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Security Research Programmes 
The second form privatisation takes is in the proliferation of security 
research programmes. Like the use of private detention centres, security 
research and development (R&D) funding for border control technology is not 
new. In a report titled “Arming Big Brother: The EU’s Security Research 
Programme,” researcher Ben Hayes identifies how the development of the 
European Security Research Programme (ESRP) in was the brainchild of the 
Group of Personalities, a 25-member advisory body of whom eight had direct 
roots in major arms-producing companies: BAE Systems, Diehl, Airbus, Ericsson, 
Finmeccanica (now Leonardo), Indra, Siemens, and Thales.  
The group first convened in October 2003, and produced a set of 
recommendations that were presented to the Commission. Then in February 2004, 
the European Commission produced a communication on the subject. 
Commission communications usually set out policy options, however in this case 
the Commission simply reproduced the recommendations of the Group of 
Personalities, and announced that “it had already established a 65-million-euro 
budget line for “Preparatory Action for Security Research” (2004-06), paving the 
way for a full European Security Research programme from 2007. There was no 
apparent consultation of the EU member states (the Council) or the European or 
national parliaments, as is normal in the establishment of EU budget lines.”272  
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The PASR was replaced by the seven year EU Framework Research 
Program (FP7, 2007-2013). €1.4 billion was allocated to “enhance public safety 
through the development of security technologies, and [foster] the growth of a 
globally competitive European ‘Homeland Security’ market.”273  
Between 2002 and 2013, 225 million euros have been committed to 
thickening the defences of “Fortress Europe” through the development of drones, 
olfactory sensors, and border patrol robots. Most of these funds have gone to the 
“big four” in the defence world, namely Airbus, Leonardo (formerly 
Finmeccanica), and Thales.274 Of the 39 publicly funded projects, “Airbus 
participated in ten, via 14 subsidiaries; Finmeccanica worked on 16 projects via 
13 subsidiaries; and Thales tallied 18 projects, also through 13 subsidiaries.”275 
The research program under FP7 was soon changed to the Secure 
Societies Challenge under the Horizon 2020 (H2020) Framework, with €1.7 
billion in funding.276 H2020 is the newest and biggest framework programme for 
research yet, with nearly 80 billion euros of funding available over 7 years.277 
One of the primary aims of the Secure Societies Challenge is “to improve border 
security, ranging from improved maritime border protection to supply chain 
security and to support the Union's external security policies including through 
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conflict prevention and peacebuilding,”278 whose implementation aligns with the 
trends identified. 60 to 70 million euro of those funds have been dedicated to 
border security-related projects including surveillance, processing, and border 
defences.279  
As Akkerman notes, “Since 2002, through FP 6 and 7, Horizon 2020, 
PASR, the GMES-Programme (satellite observation), and the European Space 
Agency (ESA), the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security and 
control with over 316 million euros [...] The fifteen largest corporate or 
institutional profiteers account for at least 94 million euros.”280 
 
The first area in which defence industry influence can be seen in the 
Horizon 2020 framework is through the Protection and Security Advisory 
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Group (PASAG). The PASAG “provides expertise to the Commission when 
preparing implementing measures, i.e. before the Commission submits these draft 
measures to a comitology committee.”281 Importantly, the advisory groups are 
never involved in assessment, procurement, or selection decisions. On this 
committee, 7 out of 30 members work with EOS-affiliated companies, and even 
more have worked for or in partnerships with one. Under H2020, transparency 
rules were changed such that people were allowed to participate in EU advisory 
groups in a “personal capacity,” provided they signed a conflict of interest 
declaration regarding any industry affiliations they may have. Furthermore, there 
are no restrictions on bidding for EU-funded projects for companies that employ 
Commission consultants. Thus, it is useful to explore some of the ties that exist 
between PASAG members and industry. 
EOS founder and CEO Luigi Rebuffi has been a PASAG and SAG (the 
advisory group under FP7) consultant, and plays a crucial role as a link between 
industry and government. According to his biography, Mr Rebuffi “now plays a 
strategic role in defining the mission and objectives of EOS; coordinates the 
implementation of the agreed strategy with Members and Partners; and supports 
and advises the 43 EOS Members. Mr Rebuffi leads EOS’ comprehensive 
advocacy approach and plays a key role promoting public – private cooperation 
on security in coordination with the activities of ASD and EOS Members. He 
ensures the effective and efficient implementation of projects directing and 
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managing EOS multi-disciplinary team, and has a decisive impact in influencing 
EU policy-making in security through communication with the European 
Institutions at the highest level. In this capacity, he is an advisor on security issues 
to the Cabinets of several EC Commissioners, is a Member of the Security 
Advisory Group on EU Security Research of DG ENTR and is President of the 
Steering Committee for security research of the French ANR (National Research 
Agency). Having a background in nuclear engineering, before EOS he worked in 
different positions at ITER, Thomson CSF, and Thales. (Emphasis mine)”282 
Luigi Rebuffi may be the most high-profile member of PASAG, yet there 
are many others. Brigitte Serreault has been a senior research coordinator at 
EADS/Airbus since 2000. Cristina Leone has been a senior manager at 
Leonardo/Finmeccanica since April 2015. Merle Missoweit acted as Head of Unit 
“International R&T Management” at Fraunhofer. Furthermore, 5 academic 
institutions that receive EU funding for security research (University of Athens, 
Oxford University, Brighton University, Salford University, and University of 
Birmingham) also employ PASAG members. For example, Sadie Creese, a 
Professor of Cybersecurity at University of Oxford, is a consultant for PASAG. 
During her time as both a professor and a consultant, the institution won contracts 
under three H2020 Secure Societies research projects.283  
It is impossible to make claims as to the level of involvement or influence 
these members have had on the committee as a whole. Similarly, it is impossible 
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to make claims of warped incentives skewed away from public good and towards 
corporate profit. These connections are presented simply to inform the reader as 
to the heavy presence of industry-affiliated actors. 
Nevertheless, Stephen Gardner argues that “Close contact between big 
corporations and the Commission arguably creates a channel for lobbying that can 
result in research projects that offer little, if any, public benefit. Many projects are 
designed to enable companies to streamline their production processes and cut 
costs.”284 
So where does the funding for these research programmes go? Dutch news 
website De Correspondent found in an investigation that roughly two thirds of the 
3 billion euros set aside for security research have been distributed. Eleven out of 
twelve of the private parties in the original Group of Personalities have received 
funding. “At €33 million, the Dutch research institute TNO has received the third-
largest research grant. Group members Thales (€32 million), Finmeccanica (€29 
million), and Airbus (€25 million) are also in the top ten. [...] Roughly €18 
million went to interest groups, including the European Organization for Security 
(EOS).”285 Surely part of the reason companies are able to secure access to such 
funding is due to the presence of their lobbyists on advisory groups like PASAG 
and the subsequent access to other levels of government that participation affords. 
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Implications 
Privatisation often introduces a corporate veil that blurs both public 
oversight and legal accountability. The lack of public oversight is amplified when 
one takes into account the fact that the populations housed within private 
detention centres are typically the most vulnerable ones, who lack access to 
recourse or even justice when their rights are violated. 
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Furthermore, as Gammeltoft-Hansen notes, “The corporate veil also 
distorts lines of legal responsibility. Human rights law is largely designed on the 
presumption that it is states and not private companies that exercise sovereign 
powers like detention or border control. Legally holding governments accountable 
for human rights violations by contractors requires an additional step showing that 
it is the state and not just the corporation or individual employee that is 
responsible for the misconduct.”286 
Finally, the pursuit of “the bottom line” often induces many companies to 
cut corners in search of fatter profit margins. This takes the form of food 
shortages, poor hygiene, overcrowding, inadequate training of officers or guards, 
and lack of access to basic resources.287 Although in the short term these cut 
corners make private security firms appear to be cost-saving, they often have 
detrimental effects in the long run that tend to be borne by the public sector. 
Indeed, every aforementioned security company operating in the UK has faced 
similar scandals, ranging from denial of access to health care to the homicidal 
suffocation of an asylum seeker from Angola, Jimmy Mubenga, during his 
deportation at the hands of G4S.288 
When the Group of Personalities first convened in October 2003, and 
produced a set of recommendations (including the establishment of a fund for 
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security research), few were concerned. Yet when the Commission released their 
communication, which essentially mimicked the recommendations the GoP had 
made, eyebrows were raised. Tony Bunyan, Statewatch Director, critiqued the 
unusual exercise in policy making by saying: “The role of the “Group of 
Personalities” in the Commission's Communication is unclear. Did the 
Commission simply reproduce the “recommendations” of the GOP's first report? 
If they did it would be most improper and unconstitutional. It is the job of the 
Commission to produce Communications, the subject of which may be the 
recommendations of an external group but the Communication itself must 
represent the views of the Commission, not those of an unaccountable group.”289 
Privatisation in its R&D form is a much subtler one due to its seemingly 
logical and benign nature. The EU is search of solutions to pressing issues in 
border control and, in an attempt to facilitate the creation of these solutions, turns 
to the private sector. This would appear to make sense. However, when one 
considers the motives of the defence industry, the logic begins to warp. It is in the 
defence industry’s best interests to use the R&D funding to develop equipment 
and technology that is seen as a legitimate solution to the issues the Commission 
presents. However, the industry’s solutions will inevitably be ones that make the 
industry indispensable, and require the EU and member states to make use of 
them. This often occurs regardless of the effects their technologies may have on 
achieving the desired goals. The defence industry has the capability to shape 
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perceptions of the best way to respond to crises or issues based upon their own 
arsenal of tools and technology. Thus, supply determines demand and corporate 
interests determine supply. 
Externalisation 
As briefly mentioned previously, privatisation of border controls is often 
linked to the externalisation of European borders. The externalisation of border 
controls -- i.e. “the process which uses various methods to transfer migration 
management beyond national borders”290 -- entered the scene quietly in the early 
2000s with Italy’s agreement with Libya. Under the agreement, Italy financed 
charter flights to remove undocumented migrants from Italian soil and return 
them to home countries, and provided technical equipment and training programs 
to reinforce and strengthen the Libyan border in attempt to stem migration from 
its source.291 Furthermore, Italy constructed camps for undocumented migrants in 
Gharyan, Kufra, and Sebah, Libya.292  
 Although the deal was criticised by European Parliament at the time as 
demonstrating a disregard for human rights (particularly towards asylum seekers 
detained in closed centres), a violation of the principle of non refoulement, and 
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subversive cooperation with an international pariah, subsequent actions of the EU 
made it clear their criticisms were largely political posturing.293   
In 2005, externalisation was formalised with the Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM) and confirmed by European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum of 2008. Today partnerships with third countries to 
tackle migration are a cornerstone of the European Agenda on Migration, and can 
be categorized as either responsive or preventive. 
Responsive Actions 
There are several examples of responsive actions. Regional Development 
and Protection Programmes increase financial and material support for countries 
hosting large populations of refugees in order to ease some of their burden.294 The 
EU has allocated €96.8 billion for the EU external cooperation assistance for 
2014-2020, and has dedicated over €1.5 billion in humanitarian assistance 
dedicated to refugees and IDPs since the beginning of 2014.295 This in many ways 
was an attempt to assist those already dealing with the issue in the hopes that their 
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financial support would be able to alleviate the financial stress associated with 
hosting a refugee population. 
The second example are the Mobility Partnerships, in which third 
countries make various commitments like readmission of their own nationals, 
undertaking initiatives to discourage illegal migration or improve their border 
control. In exchange, the EU makes commitments that fall under four broad 
categories: “improved opportunities for legal migration for nationals of the third 
country; assistance to help third countries develop their capacity to manage 
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migration; measures to address the risk of brain drain and promote circular 
migration; and improvement of the procedures for issuing visas to nationals of the 
third country.”296 Nine mobility partnerships have been signed so far, with Cape 
Verde, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan, 
Tunisia, Jordan, and Belarus. A final example of a responsive action includes 
cooperation with third countries in the fight against smugglers and traffickers. 
This involves increased cooperation between EU member states and countries that 
host smuggling networks in terms of judicial enforcement and financial 
investigations as well as joint or assisted naval operations between EU and third 
countries to search and seize smuggling ships.297  
A recent and well known example of a responsive action is the EU-Turkey 
Deal. The deal in many ways exemplifies the principles outlined previously. The 
deal came into effect on 20 March 2015 as an attempt to stem the flow of 
refugees. The proposal contains 5 key elements: 
1. “Returns: All "irregular migrants" crossing from Turkey into 
Greece from 20 March will be sent back. Each arrival will be 
individually assessed by the Greek authorities.  
2. One-for-one: For each Syrian returned to Turkey, a Syrian 
migrant will be resettled in the EU. Priority will be given to those 
who have not tried to illegally enter the EU and the number is 
capped at 72,000. 
3. Visa restrictions: Turkish nationals should have access to the 
Schengen passport-free zone by June. This will not apply to non-
Schengen countries like Britain. 
4. Financial aid: The EU is to speed up the allocation of €3bn ($3.3 
bn; £2.3 bn) in aid to Turkey to help migrants. 
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5. Turkey EU membership: Both sides agreed to "re-energise" 
Turkey's bid to join the European bloc, with talks due by July.”298 
Preventive Actions 
Preventive actions tend to be subtler and are less noticed by the general 
public, yet they are the first pillar of the EAM’s long term strategy to better 
manage migration. The Commission aims to address the root causes of migration 
in its many forms, whether it is climate change, violence, or poverty. Thus, the 
majority of preventive actions take the form of development aid programmes. 
Though on the surface this may not seem directly like the externalisation of 
border controls, the conditionalities attached to the aid often purpose the funds for 
the management of migratory flows at the expense of actual development 
programmes.299  
In many instances, there are clauses of the mobility partnerships that 
commit the EU to help third countries develop their capacity to manage 
migration. One notable example involves the relationship between Spain and 
Morocco. Starting in 1998 and escalating in 2005, the Spanish government built a 
“€30 million bulwark along the Melilla border. It consists of three fences, 12 
kilometres (7.5 miles) in length, six meters (20 feet) high, guarded by Moroccan 
soldiers on one side and the Guardia Civil on the other, to seal off Europe against 
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immigrants.”300 The EU paid Morocco €68 million between 2007 and 2010 
through the Euro-Mediterranean partnership alone in order to protect the border, 
and Frontex has coordinated joint Spanish-Moroccan operations.301 The German 
government donated Airbus equipment (including radar systems, night vision, and 
thermal imaging cameras) to Tunisia as part of their partnership.302 Finally, 
Finmeccanica delivered two AW139 helicopters for border surveillance to 
Croatia. “The total costs of over 30 million euros were covered by funds from the 
EU Schengen Facility. The Italian Coast Guard, already the owner of ten 
AW139s, ordered two more helicopters in August.”303  
In an answer to a Parliamentary question posed on 29 September 2016, Mr 
Mimica posted an annex detailing data on projects, amounts, and repartition of 
payments to the top 15 host countries of refugees eligible for funding through the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the 
Development Cooperation Instrument, and the European Development Fund on 
behalf of the Commission. This document outlined a 9 million euro grant to 
Lebanon from the European Neighbourhood Instrument for “enhanced capability 
for Integrated Border Management.” Another 8 million euros was granted to 
Jordan for “support to the Jordanian Border Guards in provision of humanitarian 
assistance to Syrian refugees crossing the Syrian-Jordanian borders” from the 
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Instrument for Stability fund. 40 million euros was given to Uganda and Sudan 
from the EU Development Fund for “Better Migration Management.”304 
Implications 
Although the externalisation of border control entered European political 
discourse somewhat quietly, it has since gained considerable attention and 
criticism, and is perhaps the most well-known of the trends. The first critique 
centres largely around cooperation with third countries. Negotiations typically 
occur based on geopolitical interest, and with countries who are considered “key” 
due to their proximity to Europe. This has meant that partnerships have occurred 
irrespective of the human rights record of the country, including partnerships with 
countries such as Sudan, Libya, and Turkey. Furthermore, the presence of 
readmission clauses in these agreements with authoritarian regimes with little 
regard for human rights could be argued to violate the principle of non-
refoulement, as well as state's obligation to evaluate asylum claims under 
international law.305  
The second critique concerns the EU’s attempts to address smuggling and 
human trafficking through cooperation with third countries. As Reslow notes, “the 
European migration control regime is increasingly characterized by the 
criminalization of migration flows and a blurring of trafficking, which by 
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definition is constituted by the coercion of migrants, and smuggling, in which 
unauthorized migrants pay for services.” This attitude of securitising migration in 
its entirety is one that is increasingly in line with the militarisation of Europe’s 
response.  
The final critique focuses on attempts to tackle root causes of migration 
through development aid. The argument is that development aid is just 
strategically repackaged migration control measures. Sara Prestianni of ARCI 
Immigrazione argues that funds for development aid “have now officially become 
incentives or penalties for cooperating or failing to cooperate with deportation and 
repatriation procedures. Development funds have become a tool for carrying out 
border control policies in countries of origin and transit.”306 Similarly, Sara 
Tesorieri, Oxfam’s EU migration policy advisory, stated “We are extremely 
concerned that European development aid is becoming increasingly influenced by 
the EU’s security interests. But strengthening security at the borders in order to 
contain migration has nothing to do with helping the populations suffering from 
poverty in developing countries or dealing with extreme inequality.”307 Although 
these critiques raise valid points themselves, they are further enforced by a report 
published in April 2016 by the European Court of Auditors on the share of 
European aid allocated to the issue of migration. The report stated that auditors 
failed to find a clear link between the development programmes and limiting 
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effects of migration.308 On the contrary, research conducted by Oxford university 
found that increased human development tends to lead to more, not less mobility, 
since those who wanted to leave previous but could not afford do so, now can.309  
This critique is the weakest due to its narrow sightedness. Prestianni and 
Tesorieri may be correct in their observation that there are political motivators, 
and not pure altruism, that drive development aid. Yet they fail to recognise or 
contextualise the greater political, geographic, social, cultural, or myriad other 
factors that influence the decisions on where to give aid, and how much to give. It 
is important to understand that the 40 million euros given to Uganda and Sudan 
from the EU Development Fund for “Better Migration Management”310 was part 
of a greater package of development aid, and that these actions are simply a small 
part of larger, longer term European strategies to address larger global migratory 
patterns that refugee flows happen to fall into. Like the increase in military 
operations, aid was a pre-existing tool that the EU simply relied more heavily on 
following the crisis. Their argument brings up valid critiques, yet loses much of 
the nuance. 
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So What? 
 In conclusion, it is important to recognize how these trends feed off of and 
reinforce each other. Policies create industries, and the development of industries 
have the power to influence policy. This can create a cycle that, when entrenched 
enough, can be difficult to break out of. In order to illustrate this point, one needs 
only to look at the evolution of attitudes towards and use of drones for border 
surveillance. Europe’s drone industry was largely funded using R&D money and 
were subsequently purchased by Member States from private companies311 
(which demonstrates privatisation). These drones have been used for the 
surveillance of land and maritime borders, and there has been debate about using 
them in EBCG led operations312 (which demonstrates militarisation). Those same 
drones have also been used for the surveillance of non-EU borders in an attempt 
to anticipate and forecast refugee flows,313 and are increasingly becoming topics 
of discussion in mobility partnership frameworks (which demonstrates 
externalisation). Finally, the information gained by these drones under the use of 
the EBCG goes into a centralised database based in Warsaw, with access given to 
relevant Member States’ authority314 (which demonstrates centralisation). At 
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several points in this process, the defence lobby has been active in lobbying for 
their use, regulations that apply to it, and their development.315 
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7 
Conclusion 
 It is no secret that that special interests are often the primary drivers 
behind many governmental policies. When discussing a governing structure as 
colossal and complex as the EU, it becomes very difficult to identify special 
interests and tease out where they influence policies. Naturally, special interests 
will lobby for policies that maximise their profit. While this is not a problem in 
theory, it becomes problematic when policies that serve the interests and influence 
of the few do so at the expense of society’s security, health, or wellbeing. 
 Disappointingly for many, the defence industry is one such example. The 
industry played a crucial role in facilitating and subsequently profiting off of 
many of the conflicts that produced mass refugee outflows – notably in the 
Middle East. Many of these refugees initially fled to neighbouring countries, 
where the abhorrent conditions and lack of hope for a future led some to dream 
bigger, and aspire to reach Europe. As they did so, it became clear that there were 
no coherent and straightforward means by which they could do so legally, 
creating a demand for alternate routes to Europe that was filled by smugglers. 
Yet, once these refugees reached Europe, they found themselves up against 
“Fortress Europe” in her many forms.  
 In this thesis, I have demonstrated how some of the same companies that 
profit off of the sources of conflict that create refugee movements also profit off 
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of Europe’s response. Europe’s response can be characterised as trending towards 
the centralisation (particularly through the creation of the EBCG), militarisation 
(as evidenced through increased construction of fences and temporary Schengen 
controls as well as an increase in border patrol operations in the Mediterranean), 
privatisation (notably through the increased use of private detention centres and 
the explosion in funds available for security research), and externalisation of 
border control and management (through the mobility partnerships and aid 
donations for border management). Furthermore, rather than defence companies 
being the passive, lucky beneficiaries of policies that were already in the making, 
they were proactive lobbyists diligently working to create the conditions and 
policies that would allow their industry to thrive and profit.  
 One of the main reasons the defence industry as a special industry was 
able to effect such change was due to the porosity of the EU. Much of this 
porosity results from the seemingly oxymoronic decentralisation and 
centralisation of decision making. It is centralised in that competencies are 
increasingly being shifted to the EU, and decentralised in that the integration 
process resulted in a complex and overlapping web of decision makers who 
interact on vertical and horizontal levels. The EU managed to achieve its goals in 
creating an inclusive institution, yet, in doing so, created myriad opportunities for 
special interest influence.  
 The winners and losers in this story seem obvious – the defence industry 
won, and the refugees lost. While this is true, there are several other actors whose 
relative gains and losses are less obvious. For one, the European public is another 
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loser. The lack of transparency leads to decreased government accountability, 
which in turn affects European citizens’ capability to demand and hold their 
government to agreed upon standards. Yet who, other than the defence industry, 
profits off of these increasingly xenophobic and militaristic responses to refugees? 
The less obvious answer is the populist leaders of Europe. In recent years, Europe 
appears to have witnessed a surge in populism and populist candidates, whether it 
is Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orban in Hungary. These candidates feed 
off of xenophobic rhetoric and their approval ratings soar in the face of “strong 
man” responses like building walls. Yet as this thesis makes clear, these responses 
have little benefit to society beyond groundlessly assuaging the fears of a small 
segment of the European populace.  
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